Turk (Deceased) v R.

A criminal prosecution of a defendant ends immediately upon that defendant’s death. Once the judge learns of the death, there is no discretion to take a further step against that defendant, save to receive proof of death and declare the indictment of no effect. This bright-line rule applies even where the jury had indicated that unanimous verdicts had been reached but had not delivered them in open court. Verdicts received after the death are irregular and a nullity. They must be set aside and any convictions annulled, notwithstanding their apparent safety or a public interest in complainants learning the result.

Darren Turk was tried at Lewes Crown Court on sexual offences and offences of possessing indecent images of children. After the jury had indicated that it had reached unanimous verdicts on some counts, but before any verdict was received, Mr Turk died.

The trial judge nevertheless received verdicts, including guilty verdicts, before receiving formal proof of death and declaring the indictment of no legal effect. Mr Turk’s mother obtained permission under section 44A of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to pursue an appeal on his behalf.

The central issue was whether a Crown Court judge may receive jury verdicts after the defendant’s death because the jury had reached them while the defendant was alive.

Appeal allowed. The court held that the verdicts received after Mr Turk’s death were a nullity. The convictions were annulled.

1. There was no statutory or common-law authority permitting a Crown Court prosecution to continue against a deceased defendant. The posthumous appeal mechanism in section 44A of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 did not create such a power at trial level.

2. The court applied the general principle stated in R v Jefferies (1968) 52 Cr App R 654: proceedings abate on a party’s death unless statute permits a representative to continue them. A Crown Court judge has no discretion once informed that a defendant has died. The judge must take no further step against that defendant except to receive proof of death and declare the indictment of no effect. An indictment may nevertheless continue against other defendants where the circumstances permit.

3. A bright-line rule was essential. The existence of a jury note indicating agreement on some counts could not justify a different result. It would otherwise create unprincipled distinctions based on how much the judge happened to know about the jury’s deliberations, and could permit continued deliberation after death.

4. The court did not find the guilty verdicts unsafe. They were nevertheless irregular because they were wrongfully received after the defendant’s death. The trial judge was also wrong to regard Mr Turk as unprejudiced: section 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 could give a conviction effect in civil proceedings.

5. Under the court’s inherent jurisdiction, recognised in R v Booth, Wood and Molland [1999] 1 Cr App R 457, the verdicts were set aside as nullities and the convictions annulled. The interests of complainants in clarity or recognition could not displace the even-handed rule that death ends the prosecution.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — allowed the appeal and set aside the verdicts received after the defendant’s death: [2017] EWCA Crim 391.

• Crown Court at Lewes — after the defendant died during jury deliberations, received unanimous verdicts and later declared the indictment to be of no legal effect. No citation for that decision was stated.