Riddell, R v

Self-defence can in principle be a defence to dangerous or careless driving. It is available only where, on the particular facts, the alleged driving itself involves the use of force in response to actual or perceived force. The offence’s constituent elements do not themselves involve force, and dangerous driving while merely fleeing will ordinarily engage duress of circumstances rather than self-defence.

Duress requires a reasonable belief in a threat of death or serious injury. Self-defence requires a genuinely held belief, while the reasonableness and proportionality of the response are assessed in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Where both defences might arise, the judge should select the defence that is apposite to the facts.

Tracey Riddell appealed convictions at Snaresbrook Crown Court for making off without payment and dangerous driving. The jury had been unable to agree on an alternative count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The prosecution case was that, after a dispute over a taxi fare, Riddell repeatedly drove her car into the complainant’s legs and then drove away while he was on the bonnet. Her case was that she feared an unknown man who had followed and confronted her.

The judge directed the jury on self-defence for the assault count but on duress of circumstances for dangerous driving. The central issue was whether self-defence was capable in law of applying to dangerous driving. Riddell also appealed her sentence.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed, but the appeal against sentence was allowed. The judge should have left self-defence, rather than duress of circumstances, as the applicable defence on the dangerous-driving count.
2. Self-defence and duress of circumstances are legally distinct. Duress is closely confined and ordinarily requires a threat of death or serious injury, together with a genuinely and reasonably held belief in that threat. In self-defence, the defendant’s belief in the circumstances is assessed subjectively. The force used must nevertheless be reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be. This common-law position is confirmed by Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, section 76.
3. There was no principled basis for a categorical rule excluding self-defence from dangerous or careless driving. Such charges do not inherently allege force, so self-defence will rarely arise. It cannot ordinarily apply where a driver merely flees from threatened force. It may apply where the alleged driving itself involves using responsive force against actual or perceived force. That approach was consistent with the focus on the underlying driving facts in Renouf, [1986] 1 WLR 522, and with the unusual circumstances discussed in Symonds, [1998] Crim LR 280.
4. Where both defences are potentially available, the judge should choose the apposite defence rather than formulate both. On these facts, self-defence was the appropriate defence. However, the conviction was safe. The appellant’s conduct could not be justified on the evidence of the complainant and the independent witnesses, and counsel had raised no objection to the directions at trial.
5. The court quashed the ten-month custodial sentence for dangerous driving and substituted six months’ imprisonment suspended for 18 months. No separate penalty was imposed for making off without payment. The three-year driving disqualification was reduced to 18 months; the extended re-test requirement remained.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — in [2017] EWCA Crim 413, dismissed the appeal against conviction and allowed the appeal against sentence, substituting a suspended sentence and reducing the disqualification period.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook — on 4 October 2016, convicted Tracey Riddell of making off without payment and dangerous driving. The jury was discharged from returning a verdict on the alternative assault count. The court imposed ten months’ imprisonment and a three-year driving disqualification with an extended re-test requirement.