Conroy, R. v

Under section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, the ability to form a rational judgment is an open-ended statutory question. It is not confined to appreciating whether conduct is morally right or wrong. A jury should apply the statutory language without gloss, assess the psychiatric evidence, and consider all relevant circumstances bearing on the defendant’s mental functioning and decision-making.

A direction which artificially separates thought processes from the ultimate decision may be imprecise. It will not render a conviction unsafe, however, where the summing-up read as a whole fairly presents the issues, the imprecision could only assist the defence, and the jury were entitled to prefer the prosecution expert evidence.

The appellant was convicted of murder at Bristol Crown Court on 1 October 2015. The sole issue at trial was diminished responsibility under section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957.

The psychiatric experts agreed that he had autism spectrum disorder, an abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recognised medical condition. They disagreed over substantial impairment of his ability to form a rational judgment or exercise self-control, and over causation. The judge directed the jury to focus on the thought processes leading to the killing rather than its outcome. The appellant contended that this direction materially misdirected the jury and made the conviction unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction was safe. The jury were entitled to accept the prosecution psychiatrist’s evidence and reject the defence of diminished responsibility.

2. The current version of section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 differs from the earlier provision considered in Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396. The ability to form a rational judgment is not confined to deciding whether conduct is right or wrong. Nor is every killing necessarily an irrational outcome. The jury must assess the defendant’s abnormality of mental functioning, its extent, and its impact on decision-making generally and on the decision to kill.

3. Thought processes and the ultimate decision cannot always be separated. A defendant may make an irrational decision for a delusional reason yet take apparently logical steps to implement it. Conversely, a morally wrong decision may be rational. Directions should therefore adhere closely to the statutory language and then marshal the psychiatric evidence against the statutory issues, without undue elaboration.

4. The impugned direction was imprecise because it treated the outcome as outside the jury’s deliberations and described it as irrational on any view. It did not, however, prejudice the appellant. It was more favourable to the defence than the prosecution evidence, which was that both the decision and the conduct were rational, albeit morally wrong. Read as a whole, the summing-up was fair, balanced and clear; any misstatement had no material adverse effect.

5. As the appellant was 18 at the time of the offence, the sentence should have been, and should be, expressed as custody for life under section 93 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) In [2017] EWCA Crim 81, dismissed the appeal against conviction for murder and stated that the sentence should be expressed as custody for life.

• Bristol Crown Court On 1 October 2015, following trial before Judge Cottle and a jury, convicted the appellant of murder. The only defence issue was diminished responsibility.