Js (A Child) v Director of Public Prosecutions

A criminal conviction must be quashed where magistrates’ reasons create the impression that they may have applied the wrong burden or standard of proof. Prosecution evidence may call for an evidential explanation from the defendant, but the legal burden remains on the prosecution. The tribunal must consider whether the defendant’s explanation is, or may be, true. A general statement that it is sure of guilt does not cure defective reasoning. Youth Court informality cannot displace clarity or legal accuracy.

The appellant, a child, was convicted by Camberwell Magistrates of tampering with a motor vehicle, contrary to section 25 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The prosecution relied principally on the presence of the appellant’s DNA on exposed ignition wires. The appellant admitted touching the moped but said that he believed it had been abandoned and denied intending to tamper with it.

The Magistrates stated that the prosecution had presented a viable case, that the appellant’s evidence had not persuaded them that he did not tamper with the moped, and that they were sure of his guilt. On appeal by way of Case Stated, the issue was whether those reasons demonstrated a correct application of the burden and criminal standard of proof.

1. Appeal allowed; conviction quashed. The Magistrates’ reasons had to be read as a whole, and the court should avoid an excessively technical semantic analysis. Nevertheless, the tribunal must apply the correct test and must be seen clearly to have done so.
2. The reference to a prosecution case being “viable” was unobjectionable in context. It meant that the evidence was capable of founding a conviction without a satisfactory explanation and was sufficiently strong to call for an answer.
3. The two-stage approach was, in principle, orthodox. Prosecution evidence could impose an evidential burden on the appellant to explain the presence of his DNA, while the legal burden of proving guilt remained on the prosecution.
4. However, the statement that the appellant’s evidence had not persuaded the Magistrates that there was no intention to tamper suggested a burden heavier than an evidential burden. The Magistrates also failed to state that they had considered whether the appellant’s explanation was, or might be, true.
5. A mere possibility that the defendant is not guilty prevents a finding that the court is sure of guilt. The later statement that the Magistrates were “sure” did not cure the defective reasoning. Youth Court simplicity and brevity do not justify reduced clarity or legal accuracy.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On an appeal by way of Case Stated, the court answered the Magistrates’ question “No” and quashed the conviction.
• Camberwell Magistrates’ Court: Convicted the appellant of tampering with a motor vehicle under section 25 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.