Jake Worsley, R (on the application of) v Tameside Magistrates' Court

For a case stated from a Magistrates’ Court, an application is frivolous only when it is futile, misconceived, hopeless or academic. It cannot be rejected merely because the justices consider their decision correct. A criminal defendant has a right to make closing submissions before guilt is determined. Convicting first creates serious procedural unfairness, and later hearing submissions does not cure the appearance that the bench had closed its mind. A decision under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is reviewed for Wednesbury irrationality. Breaches of the Road Traffic Act 1988, other than failure to give the statutory warning, do not automatically make blood evidence inadmissible. The conviction was quashed and the matter remitted for retrial.

The claimant sought judicial review of Tameside Magistrates’ Court’s refusal to state a case after convicting him of failing to provide a blood specimen without reasonable excuse. He advanced two grounds: that the Magistrates had wrongly refused to state a case on the admission of MGDD/C evidence under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and that they had convicted him before hearing closing submissions.

The Crown Prosecution Service accepted the premature-verdict ground but contested the exclusion ground. The central issues were whether the refusal was frivolous, whether the conviction could stand after the premature verdict, and whether the Magistrates’ decision on the section 78 application was irrational.

1. Disposition. Permission was granted and the claim for judicial review was allowed on both grounds. The refusal to state a case was not made by the Magistrates themselves and was vitiated by material errors. Under the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, an application was not frivolous merely because the decision-maker considered the conviction correct.
2. Premature verdict. The defendant had a procedural right under rule 24.3(3)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025 to make closing submissions before the court determined guilt. Convicting before hearing those submissions was a serious procedural failing. Applying the apparent-bias approach in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, a fair-minded and informed observer would have found it difficult to see how the Magistrates could retain an open mind after announcing guilt and proposing sentence. Later hearing submissions did not cure the defect.
3. Exclusion ground. The section 78 inquiry was an evaluative fairness assessment. Apart from failure to give the warning required by section 7(7) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, statutory breaches did not automatically make the evidence inadmissible. The High Court’s review was limited to Wednesbury irrationality. The Magistrates were entitled to treat inconsistencies in the officer’s account as matters for cross-examination and to accept a rational competing analysis of the medical procedure. The question was therefore answered Yes.
4. The conviction was quashed. The case was remitted to the Magistrates for further directions, retrial if appropriate before a differently constituted bench, and sentence for the separate driving offence. Any retrial should be before a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts).

Administrative Court: The claimant challenged Tameside Magistrates’ Court’s refusal to state a case following his conviction. The claim was allowed, the refusal was quashed, the premature-verdict question was answered No, the exclusion question was answered Yes, and the conviction was quashed and remitted.