A Local Authority v HB (Alleged Risk of Radicalisation and Abduction)

In proceedings alleging radicalisation, extremist beliefs and a risk of removal to a war zone, the local authority bears the burden of proving the pleaded facts on the balance of probabilities. Suspicion, surmise, speculation and guilt by association are insufficient. Findings must rest on the empirical evidence, considered in its wider context, together with reasonable inferences. A parent’s failure to establish an alternative explanation does not prove the local authority’s case. The court must also link proved facts to the statutory threshold and welfare consequences. The applications were dismissed because the evidence did not establish that the mother held extremist views, supported the so-called Islamic State, intended to take the children to Syria, or intended to provide funds or items to extremists.

A local authority brought parallel proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction and Part IV of the Children Act 1989 concerning two children. It alleged that their mother had extremist views, was connected with a family network of extremists, had attempted to take the children to Syria, and had sought to provide funds or items to persons associated with the so-called Islamic State.

The evidence concerned trips to Turkey, attempted travel to Turkey and Dubai, cash carried by the mother, family associations, and statements attributed to one child. The central questions were whether the allegations were proved on the balance of probabilities and whether the children were consequently at risk of significant harm or required protective orders.

1. Applications dismissed. The local authority failed to prove that the mother sympathised with extremist views or the so-called Islamic State, belonged to a family network of extremists, sought to take the children to Syria, or sought to provide funds or items to extremists.
2. The ordinary principles of fact-finding applied. The burden rested on the local authority, and the standard was the balance of probabilities. The mother was not required to prove her innocence or establish her alternative account. Her failure to do so would not, without more, establish the local authority’s case. The court had to decide whether events occurred, rather than find that they might have occurred.
3. Findings had to be based on evidence, not speculation, and assessed on the broad canvas of the evidence. Suspicion was insufficient. The court was required to consider the reliability of the evidence, the wider social and factual context, and only those inferences reasonably supported by the evidence before it.
4. The mother’s lies about the purpose of her Turkish travel were relevant to credibility, but did not prove the more serious allegations. The court accepted that the journeys were extremely unwise and placed the children in a vulnerable position, but found that they did not expose them to a risk of significant harm.
5. Family association alone could not establish radicalisation or extremist belief. The fact that a brother was an Islamist extremist who fought and died in Syria did not prove that the mother shared his views or supported his actions. Treating her as an extremist merely because of that relationship would amount to guilt by association.
6. The court applied the statutory framework. In the Part IV proceedings the threshold under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 had to be met, and welfare remained paramount under section 1. Orders under the inherent jurisdiction likewise required proof that they were in the children’s best interests. Neither basis was established.