A Local Authority v Mother & Ors (Radicalisation Fact Finding)

In fact-finding proceedings concerning alleged radicalisation, the local authority bears the burden of proving the pleaded facts on the balance of probabilities. Suspicion, speculation and assertion are insufficient. Findings must be rooted in the totality of the empirical evidence, assessed on a broad canvas and with proper regard to credibility, hearsay and reasonable inferences.

The court must distinguish private belief from harmful manifestation, identify what is meant by terrorism, radicalisation and extremism, and link proved facts expressly to the alleged threshold harm. A parent’s religious devotion or association with extremists does not, without more, establish radicalisation. The court must decide whether the evidence establishes a continuing risk of significant physical or emotional harm to the child.

The local authority sought a care order for a child whose parents had travelled from the United Kingdom to Syria and Iraq, lived for a substantial period in territory controlled by ISIL, and returned through Turkey. The father was detained abroad and did not participate in the fact-finding hearing. The mother accepted that the child had been exposed to significant harm in Syria and in detention in Turkey, but denied sharing the father’s extremist beliefs or posing any continuing risk of radicalisation, flight or terrorism.

The central issues were the parents’ beliefs and intentions, the purpose of their marriage and journey, the significance of the mother’s social-media activity, and whether the evidence established continuing risks to the child.

1. Applicable principles. The court adopted the principles summarised in A Local Authority v HB and Others [2017] EWHC 1437 (Fam). The local authority bore the burden of proving the pleaded facts on the balance of probabilities. The court had to assess the evidence in its totality, avoid speculation, and distinguish suspicion from proof. It also had to link the facts found to the alleged threshold harm.
2. Evidence and concepts. Hearsay evidence could be admitted and considered in the investigative context of public law proceedings, but its reliability and weight required careful scrutiny. The statutory definition of terrorism in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, together with the definitions of radicalisation and extremism in the Prevent guidance, provided the relevant conceptual framework. Religious belief, association with an extremist person, or objectionable expression did not alone prove an extremist mindset.
3. Findings. The father held extremist views supporting violent jihad and ISIL and intended, before leaving the United Kingdom, to travel to Syria to fight for ISIL. The mother’s Twitter activity, the circumstances and speed of the marriage, her conduct before departure, the journey itself, and her continued relationship with the father established on the balance of probabilities that she shared an extremist ideology supportive of ISIL and knowingly travelled with him to ISIL-controlled territory.
4. Threshold and risk. The child had been exposed to significant harm through the parents’ deliberate entry into a known war zone and the conditions in Syria and Turkey. The mother’s continuing beliefs, lack of insight, inability to recognise the risk posed by the father, and failure to provide an honest account established risks that she would radicalise the child, remove her to an unsafe location, or behave consistently with extremist ideology.
5. The fact-finding hearing therefore determined the findings set out in the schedule. The threshold for a public law order was satisfied.

First-instance fact-finding decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.