A Local Authority v M & Ors (Fact Finding) (Rev 1)

In care proceedings, religious belief is protected, but the State may restrict its manifestation where proportionate intervention is necessary to protect children from harm. Conventional safeguarding principles apply in cases involving alleged radicalisation. The court must decide each case on its facts and distinguish lawful religious observance from exposure to terrorism, hatred or violent extremist ideology.

The local authority bears the burden of proving the threshold facts on the balance of probabilities. Findings must rest on the totality of the evidence, including properly drawn inferences, rather than suspicion or speculation. A respondent’s failure to establish an affirmative case does not prove the local authority’s case.

The local authority brought care proceedings concerning four children after their mother took them from England to Turkey and was apprehended near the Syrian border. The mother was subsequently convicted of child abduction. The local authority alleged that she intended to take the children onwards to Syria, had exposed them to radical and pro-ISIL views, and had neglected their educational and health needs. It also alleged that the father knew of, condoned or failed to prevent the children’s exposure to those risks.

The fact-finding hearing concerned the parents’ beliefs and conduct, the purpose of the journey, the children’s exposure to extremist ideology, and the father’s responsibility for failing to protect them.

1. The court applied the established fact-finding principles in Re B [2008] UKHL 35, Re S-B [2009] UKSC 17 and Re L and M (Children) [2013] EWHC 1569 (Fam). The local authority retained the burden throughout. The standard was the balance of probabilities. The court considered the evidence in the round, assessed credibility, and distinguished permissible inference from speculation.

2. Religious freedom includes the freedom to hold beliefs, manifest them, associate with others and bring up children within those beliefs. That protection does not prevent proportionate limits on conduct which harms children or threatens their physical or emotional welfare. Mere strong religious observance is not objectionable; indoctrination involving terrorism, hatred or violent extremism may be seriously abusive.

3. The court treated radicalisation as a fact-sensitive safeguarding issue. The wider counter-terrorism context was relevant to understanding the evidence, but the children’s welfare remained paramount. The court found that the mother had actively supported extremist groups and had exposed the children to radical views through demonstrations, associations, education and family activities.

4. The court found that the mother had unlawfully removed the children to Turkey and had intended to take them onwards to Syria. The conclusion arose from the cumulative evidence, including the secretive and circuitous route, the use of return and single tickets, the dedicated telephone, the luggage arrangements, the children’s evidence and the mother’s lies. Her failure to prove a rescue explanation did not itself establish the local authority’s case.

5. The father did not share the mother’s extreme views, but knew of them, failed to protect the children from their consequences, allowed educational and other arrangements which exposed them to risk, and misled the police, professionals and the court. The court found relevant allegations against him established, while declining to find that he was part of the abduction plan or shared the mother’s ideology.

6. The findings sought by the local authority were therefore made substantially against both parents, subject to the specific qualifications stated in the judgment. The father required further urgent assessment, and the court indicated that the children’s return to his care would remain remote until he demonstrated insight and honesty.

First-instance fact-finding judgment. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.