Y (A Minor : wardship)

Wardship remains available as a flexible, residual protective jurisdiction notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by Children Act 1989, s 100. Section 100(2) prevents wardship being used to require a child to be placed in local-authority care or supervision, but does not prevent wardship where the child is voluntarily accommodated. The court may tailor the intervention to the risks facing the child, from a light-touch arrangement to more coercive protective measures. A real and significant risk of very serious harm may justify the fullest measures available. The jurisdiction is fact-sensitive and does not establish a universal model: in some cases, particularly involving younger children or separation from family, care proceedings may be required.

Brighton and Hove City Council sought the continuation of wardship for Y, aged 16, because of concerns that he might travel abroad to join the conflict in Syria, following the deaths of two of his brothers. Y’s mother opposed continuation, asserting that she could prevent travel and control access to his passport and documents. The local authority relied on the protective effect of wardship and its ability to support professional cooperation. The court therefore considered whether wardship was available and appropriate in circumstances involving radicalisation risk, parental inability to control the child’s conduct, and voluntary accommodation by the local authority.

1. Wardship continued. The court renewed the wardship order. Y did not oppose it, while his mother’s opposition was rejected because there was no evidence that she could impose the boundaries necessary to control his behaviour or prevent travel.
2. Wardship had survived the introduction of the Children Act 1989 in a residual form. Section 100(2) prevented an order in wardship from requiring a child to be placed in the care of, or under the supervision of, a local authority. It did not expressly or implicitly prevent the court making a child a ward where the child had been voluntarily accommodated by the local authority.
3. The jurisdiction was flexible and could provide bespoke solutions. It could operate with a light touch, but could also remove parental responsibility from the parents or local authority and place it with the High Court. The guidance in Re S (Wardship) Guidance in Cases of Stranded Spouses and the approach illustrated by Re K (Children with Disabilities: Wardship) supported that analysis. The court also noted the Court of Appeal’s endorsement of wardship as an appropriate solution in Re E.
4. The risk to Y was real, insidious and significant. Risk had to be assessed by reference both to its likelihood and to the seriousness of the possible consequences. A high risk of very serious harm could justify the fullest protective measures. Radicalisation within a family committed to extremist beliefs could present a process analogous to grooming in sexual-abuse cases.
5. The decision was not intended to establish a paradigm approach. Depending on the child’s age, circumstances and any necessary separation from family, care proceedings under the Children Act might be appropriate. In this case wardship was a proportionate and effective intervention.