E (A Child), Re

Section 100 of the Children Act 1989 prevents the inherent jurisdiction from being used to require a local authority to accommodate, care for or supervise a child. It does not prevent wardship where the child is already accommodated voluntarily under section 20.

Wardship may therefore coexist with voluntary accommodation. If that accommodation ends, however, the court cannot use wardship to compel the local authority to continue accommodating or supervising the child. Any compulsory placement must follow the statutory route, including the required threshold findings for a care or supervision order.

A child was accommodated voluntarily by a local authority under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The judge considered making no order, a care order or a wardship order. He regarded wardship as the outcome most likely to promote the child's welfare, but concluded that section 100(2)(b) deprived him of jurisdiction. He therefore made a final care order.

The parents appealed with the judge's permission. The issue was whether section 100 prevented the court from making a child a ward of court while voluntary accommodation under section 20 remained in place.

1. Appeal allowed. Section 100 of the Children Act 1989 did not prevent the court from making the child a ward while the voluntary section 20 placement continued. The care order was set aside and replaced by the wardship order which the judge had considered most likely to promote the child's welfare (Thorpe LJ; Rimer LJ and Baron J agreeing).

2. Section 100 prevents the court from using wardship or the inherent jurisdiction to require a child to be placed in a local authority's care, put under its supervision or accommodated by it. A compulsory result of that kind requires the proper statutory route. The court must make the necessary threshold findings before exercising its discretion to make a care or supervision order. The inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent those safeguards.

3. Section 100 contains no express or implied prohibition against wardship where the local authority is accommodating the child voluntarily under section 20. A wardship order does not itself require accommodation when the parties have already agreed to the placement. This construction was consistent with subsections 20(8) and 20(9), the description of wardship in Practice Direction 12B, and the approach taken in Re K (Children) [2012] EWHC.

   If either party terminates the voluntary accommodation agreement, the wardship court cannot require the local authority to continue accommodating or supervising the child. The jurisdiction therefore depends upon the voluntary placement remaining in effect.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was allowed. The final care order was set aside and replaced by a wardship order: [2012] EWCA Civ 1773.

2. Coventry County Court: HHJ Bellamy concluded that section 100(2)(b) of the Children Act 1989 prevented wardship, despite considering it the outcome most likely to promote the child's welfare. Having rejected the option of making no order, he made a final care order and granted permission to appeal.