EF and GH (Children) (Rev 1)

Section 31(2) requires significant harm, or likelihood of it, and attribution to care that it would not be reasonable to expect a parent to provide. The threshold does not require parental culpability or intention. A parent’s character or illness matters only so far as it affects parenting quality. A parent who recognises that illness prevents full-time care and makes a timely request for alternative care may satisfy the reasonable-parent standard. A terminal illness does not by itself justify compulsory intervention. Where the threshold is not met, care proceedings may be dismissed while voluntary accommodation under section 20 continues and wardship protects the children if necessary.

Leicester City Council brought care proceedings concerning two children whose mother had terminal cancer. The children had been accommodated under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 at her request because her illness prevented full-time care. They were later made subject to interim care orders.

The local authority and Children’s Guardian relied on the mother’s fluctuating health and the absence of a settled future care plan. The mother argued that she had acted reasonably by arranging alternative care and continuing to support the foster placement. The issue was whether section 31(2) was satisfied.

1. Care proceedings dismissed. The threshold criteria in section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 were not met. The children remained accommodated under section 20 with their mother’s consent and support, and were made wards of court during their minority or until further order.
2. Section 31(2) contains two limbs, each requiring significant harm or likelihood of significant harm and attribution to unreasonable parental care.
3. The test requires causation, not culpability, fault or intention. Parental character is relevant only so far as it affects parenting quality.
4. The mother made a timely request for alternative care, accepted the foster placement, cooperated with the local authority and accepted advice. The court therefore found that the required attribution was not established.
5. Terminal illness and uncertainty about future carers did not, alone, justify State interference with family life.
6. Wardship was compatible with continued voluntary accommodation under section 20. Section 100 prevented wardship from requiring local-authority care or supervision, but permitted protective wardship while accommodation remained voluntary.