Ats v Municipal Court of Dabas, Hungary

On an extradition appeal, the High Court may intervene only where the extradition judge ought to have answered a question differently and that answer would have required discharge. Findings of fact receive substantial respect. Knowingly leaving the requesting state without complying with notification obligations may make delay neither unjust nor oppressive. Serious interference with family life, including severe effects on children, does not automatically outweigh the public interest in extradition. Applying HH and Norris, exceptionally severe consequences may justify refusing extradition, but such cases are rare where the conduct would probably attract an immediate custodial sentence in the United Kingdom. New evidence must be shown to have resulted in a different decision; evidence which merely confirms material already considered is insufficient.

The appellant challenged an order made by District Judge Devas at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 30 September 2016 for her extradition to Hungary to face an accusation of complicity in a significant bank fraud. She relied principally on delay under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 and on the impact of extradition on her Article 8 rights and those of her three children under section 21A.

The district judge found that she had knowingly left Hungary without providing required contact details and that the delay was substantially attributable to her. He also concluded that, despite the serious consequences for the children, extradition was proportionate. On appeal, further social-work evidence concerning possible alternative care was admitted under section 27(4). The central questions were whether the district judge ought to have reached a different decision and whether the new evidence would have required a different result.

1. Appeal dismissed. The district judge’s findings that the appellant knowingly failed to notify the Hungarian authorities of her whereabouts, and that the resulting delay was neither unjust nor oppressive, were findings of fact reached on a proper approach. The description of her as a “fugitive” was only shorthand and did not alter the statutory analysis under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. Section 27(3) permits the High Court to allow an extradition appeal only where the extradition judge ought to have decided a question differently and, on that basis, would have been required to order discharge. The appellate court cannot substitute its own view merely because the case was finely balanced. The judge had considered the relevant circumstances, including domestic violence, delay and the evidence concerning the children.
3. Applying the approach in HH [2012] UKSC 25, following Norris [2010] UKSC 9, the children’s interests and the severe effects of separation were important considerations. However, the public interest in trying allegations of serious crime and honouring international obligations will ordinarily prevail where a comparable offence would probably result in an immediate custodial sentence in the United Kingdom. Extradition may properly be avoided only in very rare cases, where the consequences for family life are exceptionally severe. The district judge was entitled to conclude that the balance favoured extradition.
4. Section 27(4) required the court to be satisfied that the new evidence would have produced a different decision. The additional viability assessment confirmed the earlier social-services evidence that no suitable family or friend could care for the children. It therefore did not materially alter the evidential position. The strict statutory test was not met.

The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the extradition order made by District Judge Devas at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 30 September 2016. The appeal was dismissed: [2017] EWHC 1497 (Admin).