AC & SH, R (On the Application Of) v London Borough of Lambeth Council

A local authority conducting a Children Act 1989 section 17 assessment must take reasonable steps to identify whether a child is in need and must assess the child’s needs rather than merely investigate the parent’s circumstances. Procedural fairness is fact-sensitive. An authority need not always disclose provisional adverse conclusions, but fairness normally requires an opportunity to answer material matters that are outside the applicant’s knowledge or may lead to a materially adverse finding. Where the authority accepts that a child is disabled and therefore in need, it must make a rational and sufficiently rigorous decision about what services, if any, are required. A diagnosis cannot be dismissed merely because the diagnostic report focuses on educational needs.

The claimants were children supported by their mother, who had no recourse to public funds and asserted that the family was homeless and destitute. Lambeth concluded under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 that the children were not in need, relying substantially on adverse credibility findings concerning their mother’s accommodation, available support, contact with their fathers and efforts to obtain work.

The claimants challenged the assessment on procedural fairness grounds and contended that Lambeth had failed to reassess AC after he received a formal diagnosis of autism. The procedural challenge concerned whether the mother and grandmother had a fair opportunity to address matters relied upon against them. The central issue was whether the assessment had lawfully and adequately addressed AC’s needs as an autistic child.

1. Procedural fairness. A public body must act fairly, but the content of fairness depends on the circumstances. An authority need not disclose provisional conclusions in every assessment. It is generally unfair to rely on a materially adverse conclusion that could readily be shown to be false without giving the person concerned a fair opportunity to address it. That requirement is less forceful where the relevant matters are already known to the person and have been repeatedly raised for explanation.
2. Lambeth’s failure to put its provisional credibility conclusions to the mother did not render the assessment unlawful. She knew that her accommodation history, sources of support, contact with the children’s fathers and efforts to obtain work were central issues. The relevant concerns had been raised in earlier correspondence and during the assessment. The grandmother had also been contacted and the adverse findings concerning her conduct were subsidiary rather than central. The procedural fairness ground therefore failed.
3. Assessment of AC. Lambeth accepted that AC’s autism diagnosis brought him within the broad definition of disability in section 17. That status did not automatically require the provision of services, but it required a rational decision about what support was necessary and appropriate. The authority had to assess the statutory criteria, including whether without services AC was unlikely to achieve or maintain a reasonable standard of health or development, or whether his health or development was likely to be significantly impaired.
4. The September assessment contained little evaluation of AC’s needs as an autistic child. It did not adequately address his educational difficulties, communication and behavioural presentation, the effect of unstable accommodation, or the possible connection between his disability and social care needs. The social worker’s later statement did not explain sufficiently what features had been considered or how the conclusions had been reached. The assessment was therefore not sufficiently rigorous or compliant with the relevant guidance.
5. The court could not be satisfied that a lawful assessment would inevitably have produced the same outcome. Section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 did not prevent relief. The decision was quashed and Lambeth was required to carry out a fresh assessment and to accommodate and support the claimants while it was undertaken, unless they left the United Kingdom with their mother.

First-instance judicial review. No appellate decision is stated in the judgment.