Dabrowski v Regional Court In Radom (Poland)

In extradition proceedings, Article 8 compatibility requires a straightforward balancing exercise between the public interest in extradition and the interference with the requested person’s private and family life. There is no separate test of exceptionality. Relevant matters include unexplained delay, its effect on the person’s circumstances, mental illness, established family support and the practical consequences of surrender. The court must assess whether the lower court’s decision was wrong and may conduct its own balancing exercise. Under the proportionality provisions, less coercive measures must be identified as both available and appropriate. A proposed interview will not constitute an appropriate alternative where it would have no realistic practical effect.

The appellant appealed under section 26(1) of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s decision of 25 July 2016 ordering his extradition to Poland on an accusation European arrest warrant concerning an alleged 2008 robbery.

He relied on oppression through delay under section 14, incompatibility with Article 8 rights under section 21A(1)(a), and disproportionality under section 21A(1)(b). His case was affected by chronic schizophrenia, dependence on medication and substantial reliance on his mother. The central issues were the correct Article 8 approach, the significance of delay and family circumstances, and whether an interview request was a less coercive measure.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The District Judge was entitled to conclude that extradition would not be oppressive under section 14. The appellant bore the burden of showing oppression. The evidence indicated that appropriate treatment and medication would probably be available in Poland, whether he was on bail or in custody, and the risk of relapse did not require the statutory threshold to be met.

2. Ground 2 allowed. The District Judge had adopted an erroneous approach to Article 8 by referring to exceptionality and a very high threshold, and by importing the section 14 concept of oppression. The correct approach, confirmed in H H v Italy [2012] UKSC 25 and Poland v Celinski [2015] EWCA 1274, was to balance the very high public interest in extradition against the effect on Article 8 rights.

3. That exercise required proper consideration of the six-year unexplained delay, the appellant’s settled and open life in the United Kingdom, the onset and treatment of his serious mental illness, his dependence on his mother, and the effect of surrender on her ability to care for him. The delay diminished the weight of the public interest. The combined risk of psychiatric deterioration, loss of stable treatment and significant hardship made extradition incompatible with Article 8. The District Judge’s decision was wrong, and the appellant was discharged under section 27(3).

4. Ground 3 failed. The court did not need finally to resolve whether mutual legal assistance could constitute a less coercive measure under section 21A(3)(c), although it was inclined to follow Puceviciene v Lithuania [2016] EWHC 1862 and Sutas v Lithuania [2017] EWHC 156. In any event, the proposed interview was not an appropriate alternative. The requesting authorities knew of the appellant’s condition, the withdrawal statement and the request for interview, and the interview would not realistically advance matters.

The appeal was allowed on ground 2 and the appellant was discharged.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal against the District Judge’s decision of 25 July 2016 ordering extradition. Grounds 1 and 3 failed; ground 2 succeeded and the appellant was discharged under section 27(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.