Balog v Court in Okresny Sud, Humenne, Slovak Republic

In an extradition appeal, the court may refuse a further adjournment where the party has already had a proper opportunity to obtain evidence and further delay would be disproportionate to the efficient use of court resources. A person who knowingly remains outside the requesting state after conviction and does not notify the relevant court of an address may be treated as a fugitive for the purposes of the passage-of-time bar. The court must nevertheless consider Article 8 separately. Delay may reduce the weight of the public interest in extradition and may demonstrate the development of private and family life. Where the requested person is to serve a significant sentence for offences still in issue, uncertainty about the precise breakdown of an aggregate sentence will not necessarily make extradition disproportionate.

The appellant appealed against an order of the Westminster Magistrates’ Court dated 18 November 2016 directing his return to Slovakia under a European Arrest Warrant. The warrant concerned five convictions and an aggregate sentence. The Magistrates’ Court discharged the appellant on two offences but ordered his return on three, rejecting arguments based on the passage of time and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Permission to appeal and permission to rely on further evidence were granted by Whipple J. The appellant challenged findings that he had not notified the Slovak court of his United Kingdom address and was therefore a fugitive. He also challenged the assessment of delay, family life, the sentence remaining to be served and the proportionality of extradition.

1. The adjournment application was refused. The appellant had already been given an opportunity to obtain further evidence. A second application on the morning of the substantive hearing, on a developing evidential basis, would cause further delay and was inconsistent with the proportionate use of court time and resources.
2. The District Judge was entitled to find that the appellant had not notified the Slovak court of his United Kingdom address. The evidence supporting notification had materially changed and was contradicted by the requesting state’s records. The appellant had known of his conviction and outstanding imprisonment, yet had made no effective enquiry about the proceedings. The District Judge was therefore entitled to treat him as a fugitive from the date of the final judgment for the purposes of section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.
3. Even if the fugitive finding had been wrong, the conclusion that extradition would not be oppressive was open to the District Judge. The challenge under Article 8 required a separate proportionality assessment. Passage of time could reduce the weight of the public interest in extradition and could demonstrate the development of private and family life. Those factors were substantial, but the public interest remained weighty, particularly because the appellant had developed that family life while aware of the outstanding sentence.
4. The absence of a precise breakdown of the aggregate sentence, and the possible effect of later Slovakian legal developments, did not make the decision disproportionate. The appellant was being returned for three offences each punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment, so the sentence would still be of significant length. Detailed consideration of the precise calculation was therefore unnecessary on these facts.
5. The District Judge’s errors concerning the date of release from pre-trial detention were immaterial. The appeal failed and was dismissed.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: On 18 November 2016, District Judge Tempia ordered the appellant’s return to Slovakia under a European Arrest Warrant, while discharging him on two of the five offences.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Whipple J granted permission to appeal and permission to rely on fresh evidence. Mr Justice Holroyde refused a further adjournment, rejected the challenges and dismissed the appeal.