Konecny v District Court Czech Republic

For the statutory passage-of-time bar to extradition, a convicted person becomes unlawfully at large when a lawful sentence is imposed. The person’s knowledge of the conviction or sentence is irrelevant to that objective question. Oppression requires more than ordinary hardship, while injustice primarily concerns real prejudice to the fairness of a future trial. Under Article 8, unexplained delay is a powerful factor against extradition, but its weight remains fact-specific and must be balanced against the public interest, the seriousness of the offending, the sentence imposed and any right to retrial.

The claimant appealed against District Judge Ashworth’s decision of 24 April 2017 ordering his extradition to the Czech Republic to serve an eight-year sentence for fraud. He argued that extradition was barred by section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 and would disproportionately interfere with his and his partner’s Article 8 rights.

The claimant had been convicted in his absence in 2008, without knowledge of the proceedings, and had lived and worked in England for approximately ten years. He would have an unfettered right to a retrial on return. The central issues were when the statutory period began, whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive, and whether the delay and its consequences made extradition disproportionate.

1. Section 14. The appeal failed on the statutory ground. In a conviction case, section 14 permits reliance only on the period since the person became unlawfully at large. Applying Wisniewski and others v Regional Court of Wroclaw, Poland and others [2016] EWHC 386 (Admin), that is an objective state of affairs: knowledge of the conviction and sentence is irrelevant. The relevant date was therefore 12 May 2008, when the sentence was imposed. The approach in Rahman v County Court of Boulogne Sur Mer, France [2014] EWHC 4143 (Admin), which treated the period as beginning with the earliest offending, was not followed.
2. Injustice primarily concerns real prejudice to the conduct of a fair trial. Oppression concerns hardship resulting from changes in the requested person’s circumstances during the relevant period. Oppression is an elusive and high threshold requiring more than ordinary hardship, as explained in Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21. The claimant’s retrial rights and the assumed compliance of any retrial with Article 6 meant that neither injustice nor oppression was established.
3. Article 8. The Article 8 issue required the fact-sensitive balancing exercise identified in Norris v Government of the United States of America (no. 2) [2010] UKSC 9, HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa 2 [2012] UKSC 25 and Celinski and Others v Polish Judicial Authority [2015] EWHC 274. Delay, including unexplained delay before certification of the European Arrest Warrant, was a powerful factor against extradition. However, the District Judge was entitled to refrain from finding culpable delay where the evidence was scant.
4. The seriousness of the offending, the lengthy sentence, the public interest in extradition, the claimant’s categorisation as a particularly dangerous recidivist under Czech law, and his absolute right to a retrial were powerful factors favouring extradition. The District Judge’s conclusion that extradition was not a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights was not shown to be wrong. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court) — The appeal against the decision of District Judge Ashworth dated 24 April 2017 was dismissed.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court — Extradition to the Czech Republic was ordered.