Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2017] EWHC 2619 (QB)

Case details

Case citations
[2017] EWHC 2619 (QB)
Court
High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Judgment date
20 October 2017
Judgment text

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Subjects
Defamation Media and communications Honest opinion
Keywords
libel natural and ordinary meaning single meaning rule statement of opinion honest opinion basis of opinion Defamation Act 2013 section 3 reasonable reader Prevent duty extremism
Outcome
issues determined (preliminary issues: meaning, opinion and basis of opinion)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

For the purposes of the statutory honest-opinion defence, the court must determine the single meaning conveyed by the publication as a whole. The ordinary reader may draw reasonable inferences from the publication’s context, but the court should avoid strained or over-elaborate analysis.

A statement that characterises publicly expressed views as extremist, contrary to British values, or requiring protection from them is ordinarily evaluative and may constitute opinion rather than fact. The basis of the opinion need only identify the subject matter of the comment in general terms. It need not specify every fact or enable the reader to assess whether the opinion is well founded.

Factual background

The claimant, the chief editor of a publicly accessible website, brought a libel claim concerning a government press release about extremism and the Prevent duty in universities. The release named him among speakers said to have expressed views contrary to British values.

The defendant contended that the words conveyed the lesser meaning that the claimant had expressed views contrary to British values. Alternatively, she relied on the honest-opinion defence under Defamation Act 2013, section 3.

The Senior Master directed a trial of three preliminary issues: the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, whether they were a statement of opinion, and whether they indicated the basis of that opinion.

Held

  1. Meaning. Reading the press release as a whole, the reasonable reader would understand it to characterise the claimant as an extremist hate speaker who legitimised terrorism and whose poisonous and pernicious influence required protection against. The reference to the claimant’s views being contrary to British values did not displace that wider meaning. The relevant links between the paragraphs concerning hate speakers, the named speakers and poisonous and pernicious ideas were sufficiently clear.
  2. Opinion. The words complained of were a statement of opinion for the purposes of section 3(2) of the Defamation Act 2013. Whether a person is an extremist, a hate speaker, or someone whose ideas require protection against involves evaluation and judgment. The phrase “on record” would be understood by the ordinary reader as referring to the claimant’s publicly stated views. The fact that a public body might later make an evaluative determination under the Prevent guidance did not alter the character of the words in a private libel action.
  3. Basis of opinion. Section 3(3) required the statement to indicate the subject matter of the opinion in general or specific terms. The press release sufficiently indicated that the opinion was based on the claimant’s publicly expressed views concerning social, religious, political or moral issues. It was unnecessary to identify the precise views criticised, the particular British values said to be infringed, or the underlying record in detail.
  4. The court therefore determined the preliminary issues in the claimant’s favour on meaning, but in the defendant’s favour on opinion and indication of basis. The statement was opinion and indicated its basis in general terms.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

The judgment records that the claimant’s related public-law challenge was dismissed by Ouseley J. in [2017] EWHC 1930 (Admin). That was separate from the preliminary-issue trial in this Queen’s Bench Division libel claim.

Appeal to higher court

Outcome of appeal
appeal dismissed (secretary of state’s application for permission to appeal on meaning refused)

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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