Ngole, R (On the Application Of) v University of Sheffield

Professional regulators and universities may regulate a trainee’s public personal conduct, including social-media speech, where it may affect public confidence in a profession or the treatment of service users. General professional standards can satisfy the requirement that an interference with Convention rights be prescribed by law, provided they are accessible and interpreted contextually. Religious motivation and content require careful consideration, but do not exempt speech from professional regulation. In assessing proportionality, the court must balance freedom of expression against public protection, while giving appropriate weight to expert professional assessments. A trainee’s lack of insight, reflection and willingness to address legitimate professional concerns may justify a severe fitness-to-practise sanction. On the facts, removal from a social-work course leading to registration was lawful and proportionate.

The claimant was a mature student on an HCPC-approved MA Social Work course at the University of Sheffield. He published a series of strongly condemnatory comments about same-sex relationships on a public website, expressing his Christian beliefs. Following investigation, the Faculty Fitness to Practise Panel excluded him from the professionally qualifying course but permitted study on a non-qualifying programme. The University Appeals Committee rejected his appeal, relying particularly on his lack of insight into the potential professional impact of the postings and his unwillingness to reflect on them.

The claimant sought judicial review, alleging unlawful interference with his rights under Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, irrationality and, later, apparent bias. The central issues were whether Article 9 was engaged, whether the professional standards were sufficiently prescribed by law, and whether the decision and sanction were proportionate and fair.

1. Article 9. The postings were religiously motivated and religious in content, but were made in a public current-affairs debate rather than in a religious context or as part of worship, devotion or recognised religious practice. There was no sufficiently close and direct nexus between the postings and the claimant’s religious belief to constitute a protected manifestation under Article 9. The court therefore considered the case under Article 10 alone.
2. Prescribed by law. The HCPC and University standards were accessible and had to be read as a whole, in their regulatory context. They clearly warned students that personal conduct, conduct outside the programme and social-media use could affect completion of the course and public confidence in the profession. Professional standards necessarily retain a degree of flexibility and need not provide an exhaustive code. They were capable of applying to public religious speech where that speech might affect service users’ perception of the profession.
3. Legitimate aim and proportionality. Protecting the public, maintaining confidence in social work, and ensuring that vulnerable service users were treated with dignity and without discrimination were legitimate aims. Applying the structured proportionality approach, the postings had a rational connection with those aims because they were publicly accessible, concerned matters relevant to social-work practice, and could reasonably cause service users to question the claimant’s professional approach. The court accepted that the postings alone might not have justified exclusion. The decisive additional considerations were the claimant’s persistent lack of insight, failure to engage with the professional concerns, and unwillingness to demonstrate that similar conduct would not recur.
4. The court undertook its own proportionality assessment but gave substantial weight to the unanimous expert judgment of those responsible for assessing the claimant’s fitness to practise and teachability. No less severe measure could safely be imposed on the evidence. The balance between Convention rights and protection of the public was fair.
5. Bias and disposition. The apparent-bias test was whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. The evidence concerning the panel chair’s LGBT-related activities did not satisfy that test. The bias application was also out of time. The judicial review claim was dismissed.