F Ngole v Touchstone Leeds

In a direct religion or belief discrimination claim, a tribunal must identify each effective reason for the impugned treatment and analyse it separately. A concern that an applicant may perform duties in an objectionable manner, or may not comply with lawful equality and service-delivery requirements, may be separable from the protected belief and may be objectively justified by a proportionate response.

However, treatment prompted merely by concern that others may discover that the applicant holds protected religious beliefs is treatment because of those beliefs. It cannot be justified as direct discrimination. The tribunal must not conflate those distinct reasons or assume that a concern about the public discovery of protected beliefs is a concern about an objectionable manifestation of them.

The claimant, a Christian applicant for a discharge mental health support worker role, was offered the post conditionally. The respondent later found news reports of his earlier social-media comments concerning homosexuality and same-sex marriage. It withdrew the offer, invited him to a further meeting, and then declined to reinstate it.

The Employment Tribunal upheld the complaint concerning the initial withdrawal of the offer, but dismissed the direct belief discrimination complaints concerning the requirement to attend the further meeting, the alleged reversal of the burden of proof, and the later refusal to reinstate the offer. The claimant appealed those dismissals.

The central issue was whether the Tribunal had correctly distinguished treatment because of protected religious beliefs from treatment because of an objectionable and separable manner of expressing or acting on those beliefs.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The Tribunal erred by failing to identify and analyse separately each reason for requiring the claimant to attend a second meeting and for refusing to reinstate the conditional offer.
2. The respondent was entitled to require the postholder to comply with its equality and anti-discrimination policies and to support LGBTQI+ service users. The claimant’s previous strong public statements made it permissible to ask whether he would express similar views at work, engage with relevant training and organisations, and perform the full duties of the role. For that purpose, requiring a further meeting and assurances was a proportionate response. It did not reverse the legal burden of proof.
3. The Tribunal nevertheless treated as part of the reason for the second meeting, and for refusing to restore the offer, the risk that service users or staff might discover the claimant’s historic posts through an internet search. It did not determine whether the anticipated objection was to an objectionable manner of expression, rather than simply to the protected beliefs that homosexuality and same-sex marriage were sinful.
4. If the operative concern was merely that others would learn that the claimant held protected beliefs, the treatment was because of belief and could not be justified. The Tribunal also failed to assess separately whether any failure to give requested assurances was genuinely severable from holding the beliefs, and whether refusal to restore the offer was proportionate in light of its greater effect.
5. The successful elements of grounds 2, 8 and 9.2 were remitted to the same Employment Tribunal. The remitted Tribunal must apply the structured analysis stated by the EAT to each effective reason for the treatment and determine its contribution to liability and, if necessary, compensation. Grounds 1, 3, 6 and 9.1 were dismissed.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Appeal allowed in part and the outstanding analysis of direct belief discrimination remitted to the same Employment Tribunal: [2026] EAT 29.
• Employment Tribunal: Employment Judge Brain, sitting with members, upheld the complaint concerning the initial withdrawal of the conditional offer but dismissed the other direct belief discrimination complaints relevant to the appeal. The judgment was sent to the parties on 21 June 2024.