Ngole, R (on the application of) v The University of Sheffield

Professional regulation may protect public confidence and ensure that service users reasonably expect dignified and non-discriminatory treatment. It cannot prohibit the legitimate expression of religious, moral or political views merely because others disagree with them.

Restrictions on expression must be applied flexibly and proportionately. A blanket prohibition on publicly expressing traditional religious views is incompatible with article 10. Offensive or aggressive language may nevertheless justify professional action.

Before imposing a career-ending sanction, a regulator or professional-course provider must identify its precise concern, distinguish belief from discriminatory conduct, engage fairly with the individual and consider less intrusive measures such as guidance or a warning.

A social-work student posted publicly accessible Facebook comments expressing Christian disapproval of homosexual acts. The University removed him from its professional course on fitness-to-practise grounds, principally because it considered that he lacked insight into the effect of the posts on service users and public confidence.

The Administrative Court dismissed his judicial-review claim. It held that article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights was engaged, but that the interference was prescribed by law, pursued legitimate aims and was proportionate.

The student appealed. The central questions were whether the University's effective prohibition on publicly expressing those religious views was lawful and whether removal from the course was a proportionate and procedurally fair response.

1. Appeal allowed. The University's disciplinary process was flawed and unfair. Its position amounted to an absolute prohibition on publicly expressing traditional religious views about homosexuality whenever those views could be traced to a social worker or student. Such a prohibition was disproportionate and went beyond the HCPC guidance.
2. The professional rules and guidance were sufficiently clear to satisfy the requirement that an interference with article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights be prescribed by law. Professional standards may necessarily be broad, especially where they cover students training for numerous professions. Their breadth requires flexible and proportionate enforcement.
3. Maintaining confidence in a profession is a legitimate regulatory aim. Its content depends upon the profession and context. Regulation may ensure that reasonable service users expect dignified and non-discriminatory treatment, and aggressive or offensive condemnation may undermine confidence. The aim cannot prohibit legitimate expression merely because many people disagree with it.
4. The University wrongly treated the expression of religious views as equivalent to discrimination. A statement that homosexual acts are sinful does not necessarily imply that its maker will discriminate. The University accepted that the appellant had not discriminated and was not expected to do so.
5. The University never adequately identified whether its concern was perceived discrimination, actual discrimination, or the language and manner of expression. Nor did it offer guidance on expressing the views with caution and diplomacy. Its own blanket position substantially caused the student's apparently entrenched response.
6. Removal from the course was not shown to be the least intrusive response. The University moved too rapidly to the conclusion that the student was unteachable. A calm process of continuing guidance, reflection or warning should have been explored before a career-ending sanction.
7. The allegation of apparent bias was rejected. Sexual orientation and participation in LGBT activities provided no proper basis for inferring bias or requiring a declaration. The appeal was remitted for a fresh hearing before a differently constituted Fitness to Practise Committee because new factual findings were required.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal. It held that the disciplinary process and sanction were disproportionate and unfair, and remitted the matter for a new fitness-to-practise hearing.
2. Administrative Court: Rowena Collins Rice, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed the judicial-review claim on 27 October 2017. No neutral citation is stated in the judgment.
3. Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education: Rejected the student's complaint, although it criticised the original Fitness to Practise Committee's lack of reasons.