Ineos Upstream Ltd & Ors v Persons Unknown & Ors

A quia timet injunction may restrain unidentified protesters where there is an imminent and real risk of unlawful interference with private property or access rights. Direct action which intentionally obstructs vehicles, including token “slow walking” and lock-ons, is unlikely to be a reasonable use of the highway.

Articles 10 and 11 protect protest, but do not justify trespass or deliberate obstruction intended to disrupt a lawful business where protest may be expressed elsewhere. Under Human Rights Act 1998 section 12, the claimant must be more likely than not to obtain final relief. An injunction must identify prohibited conduct clearly and precisely. A general prohibition on harassment was inappropriate because its uncertain scope could chill lawful protest.

The claimants, including companies engaged in shale-gas exploration and owners of relevant land, sought interim quia timet injunctions against persons unknown and two named defendants. They relied on evidence of anti-fracking direct action at other operators’ sites and contractors’ premises, including trespass, obstruction, lock-ons and interference with vehicles and equipment.

The sixth and seventh defendants sought discharge of earlier ex parte and continued interim orders. The central issues were whether threatened conduct justified interim relief, the effect of Articles 10 and 11, the use of persons-unknown defendants, alleged failures of candour, and whether the proposed injunctions were sufficiently clear.

1. The claimants’ application was granted in substantial part. The applications to discharge the earlier orders failed. The evidence established an imminent and real risk of trespass, interference with equipment, substantial interference with private rights of way, and deliberate obstruction of access to and use of the highway by the claimants and their contractors.

2. The court held that, where relief might affect freedom of expression, Human Rights Act 1998 section 12(3) applied. “Likely” meant more likely than not. On the evidence, a court at trial would be likely to restrain the threatened unlawful conduct.

3. Articles 10 and 11 did not prevent relief. Protest on a highway can sometimes be reasonable, but deliberately slow walking in front of vehicles, lock-ons and comparable conduct intended to cause inconvenience and delay went well beyond reasonable use. The protesters selected the locations to impede shale-gas operations rather than principally to communicate their views to the public. The claimants’ property and access rights therefore prevailed in the proportionality balance.

4. Interim injunctions could be granted against properly described persons unknown. The descriptions could apply to no person when the order was made; a person who later performed the prohibited act would fall within the defined class and become bound by the order.

5. The court found no material breach of the claimants’ duty of candour on the ex parte application. In any event, any breach would have been innocent and insubstantial, and the strong case for relief justified a fresh inter partes order.

6. The orders had to be clear and precise. The court granted injunctions against trespass, damage to or removal of equipment, substantial interference with specified private rights of way, and defined deliberate highway obstruction. It refused a general injunction against harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, because the term did not sufficiently identify prohibited conduct and risked chilling lawful protest. Permission was reserved to seek a later, specifically framed harassment injunction if needed.

First-instance proceedings. On 28 July 2017 the court granted ex parte interim injunctions. On 12 September 2017 it continued interim relief pending a fuller inter partes hearing. This judgment determined the claimants’ application for interim injunctions and the sixth and seventh defendants’ applications to discharge the earlier orders.