M (A Child : secure accommodation order) (Rev 1)

A secure accommodation order under Children Act 1989, s 25 is a measure of last resort. The statutory conditions are disjunctive, so satisfaction of either limb is sufficient. The requirement of likelihood must be established by reference to facts, not speculation. The court must decide whether the statutory conditions are met and must assess welfare on the basis that the local authority remains the decision-maker. Welfare is not subject to the paramountcy principle under Part 3, but it weighs heavily. A placement may be justified where containment is necessary to keep the child and others safe, provided conventional and creative alternatives have been seriously considered and exhausted.

Wigan Borough Council applied under s 25 of the Children Act 1989 for a secure accommodation order concerning M, a 15-year-old child in local authority care. M had exceptionally complex needs, a history of severe early trauma, extreme violence and repeated placement breakdowns. The local authority submitted that she posed a serious risk to herself and others and that all available alternatives had failed. The central issues were whether the statutory conditions were satisfied, whether secure accommodation was in M’s best interests, and whether the order was a proportionate last resort.

1. The application was granted. The secure accommodation order was limited to three months. The court found that M remained a serious risk to herself, her carers, other young people and the public.
2. The court adopted the principles previously stated in London Borough of Barking and Dagenham v SS, including that restricting a child’s liberty is an extremely serious step and must remain a measure of last resort. This required the local authority to consider not only conventional placements but also creative and unconventional packages of support.
3. Under s 25(1) of the Children Act 1989, the two statutory limbs operate disjunctively. Either the absconding and significant-harm limb or the injury limb is sufficient. The court must determine the statutory criteria itself. The concept of likelihood must be assessed by reference to factual findings, applying the clarification in Re B and Re SB (Children).
4. Section 25 is within Part 3 of the Act and is not governed by the paramountcy principle. Welfare must instead be assessed on the basis that the local authority is the decision-maker, asking whether secure accommodation falls within the permissible range of options available to it. The welfare checklist remains a useful guide and welfare weighs heavily.
5. The court was satisfied that numerous foster and residential placements had been attempted and had broken down, and that containment was a legitimate objective because it could keep M and others safe while providing a possible gateway to therapeutic intervention. The inadequacy of available secure and therapeutic resources was directed to the Minister for Education, and the case was listed for review within seven days.

First-instance application. No appellate history was stated.