X (Secure Accommodation: Lack of Provision), Re

The statutory secure-accommodation scheme and the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction are distinct. A secure accommodation order under Children Act 1989, s 25 may be made only where the statutory welfare and risk criteria are met, and restricting a child’s liberty remains a measure of last resort.

Courts cannot create secure placements, direct government to allocate resources, or determine national policy. They may assess whether restrictions are necessary and proportionate, and may draw attention to the consequences of inadequate provision. The chronic shortage of approved secure accommodation places leaves local authorities relying on unsuitable substitute arrangements and places significant pressure on the courts and other public authorities.

The proceedings concerned a 15-year-old child in the care of a local authority whose severe risks included absconding, self-harm, suicidal behaviour, aggression and exploitation. She had previously been placed under a secure accommodation order, but after discharge was managed in community placements under restrictions authorised through the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

In November 2022, the Family Court made a further secure accommodation order. No suitable approved placement was immediately available. The proceedings were transferred to the President of the Family Division so that the court could examine the search for a placement and the wider national shortage. A secure unit in Scotland was eventually found. The judgment addressed the statutory framework and the continuing lack of provision, rather than determining a contested legal application.

1. Nature of the judgment. The court expressly made no decision about X or, more widely, about the law. Its principal purpose was to draw public attention to the chronic national shortage of approved secure accommodation for children.
2. Statutory framework. A child may be kept in secure accommodation under Children Act 1989, s 25(1) only where the statutory absconding, significant-harm, self-harm or harm-to-others criteria are satisfied. Such an order is a serious interference with liberty and should be made only where it is the most appropriate way of meeting the child’s assessed needs, as a last resort and only very rarely. The court referred to Re SS (Secure Accommodation Order) [2014] EWHC 4436 (Fam).
3. Separate jurisdictions. Formal secure accommodation orders under s 25 are distinct from bespoke deprivation-of-liberty arrangements authorised under the inherent jurisdiction. The court noted that the Supreme Court had held the latter course lawful in Re T [2021] UKSC 35, but stressed that the shortage of statutory placements was forcing the High Court to sanction ad hoc regimes outside the statutory scheme, often in accommodation that was unsuitable for the child’s needs.
4. Allocation and institutional responsibility. The duty to provide accommodation rests principally on the relevant local authority under ss 20 and 22G. The court cannot direct that a placement be made available, provide additional accommodation, or determine government policy and resource allocation. It can assess the necessity and proportionality of restrictions in an individual case and call attention to the systemic failure.
5. Wider obligations. Although not argued, the court observed that the State must have positive obligations under European Convention rights, including Articles 2 and 3, to meet the needs of children exposed to grave risks. It concluded by urging urgent and effective action by government and Parliament.

The judgment describes earlier proceedings in which Mrs Justice Lieven made a secure accommodation order on 6 November 2022 and directed a further hearing concerning the search for a placement. The proceedings were then transferred to the President of the Family Division. The present judgment recorded no substantive determination or appeal.