Essex County Council v ST and others (Deprivation of Liberty)

Whether arrangements amount to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 must be assessed in the individual’s full context. The court must use a multifactorial evaluation of the control exercised, movement restrictions, relationships, participation in ordinary life, duration, purpose and necessity, less restrictive alternatives, and the individual’s own experience, wishes and objections. No single factor is decisive. A regime involving up to 3:1 supervision, locked doors and windows, possible restraint and a young person’s objection was a deprivation of liberty. The authorisation was nevertheless continued because serious risks remained and a time-limited step-down plan was in place. The judgment also emphasised active oversight of placement quality, education, therapeutic support and multi-agency planning.

The local authority applied under the inherent jurisdiction for authority to deprive ST, aged 15, of her liberty after repeated self-harm and absconding. A statutory secure-accommodation placement under Children Act 1989 s 25 was unavailable. The proposed regime included up to 3:1 supervision, locked doors and windows, controls on sharp objects and possible restraint. ST objected, pointing to prolonged failures in education, therapy and placement oversight. The central issues were whether the arrangements constituted a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 and whether continued authorisation was necessary, proportionate, in her best interests and the least restrictive option. The court made a time-limited order until 29 September 2026, with staged reduction of supervision.

1. Order. The local authority’s application was granted. On 7 July 2026 the court authorised ST’s deprivation of liberty until 29 September 2026. The order permitted up to 3:1 supervision by day and night, locked doors and windows, measures preventing access to sharp objects and physical restraint by suitably trained staff using minimum force for the minimum period. Supervision had stepped down to 2:1, with a planned further reduction subject to review.
2. Article 5 assessment. Applying Reference by Attorney General for N. Ireland [2026] UKSC 16, the court held that the assessment is contextual and multifactorial. The objective and subjective elements overlap and no single factor is determinative. The approach is broader than the former acid test associated with P v Cheshire West and Chester Council [2-14] UKSC 19. Relevant considerations include control, movement, relationships, ordinary life, duration, purpose and necessity, less restrictive alternatives, and the individual’s own experience and objections.
3. Application to ST. The cumulative effect of the supervision, locked doors and windows, restrictions on sharp objects and possible restraint, together with ST’s objection and inability to leave freely, meant that she was deprived of her liberty.
4. Continuation of authorisation. The court agreed that the order remained in ST’s best interests. Serious risks from self-harm and absconding remained material, including a recent hospital absconding incident. The proceedings had produced improved monitoring, an action plan and a structured route for reducing restrictions. The order was therefore continued for a defined period, with further Team Around the Placement review before the next step down.
5. Wider guidance. Echoing Re T [2021] UKSC 35 and Re X (Secure Accommodation: Lack of Provision) [2023] EWHC 129 (Fam), the judge criticised the continuing shortage of suitable secure placements. Future courts should actively check placement quality, social-worker visits, the effectiveness of education and mental-health provision, and regular multi-agency review. The judgment was directed to the local authority’s Director of Children’s Services.

This was a first-instance application. The judgment records earlier care proceedings and previous deprivation-of-liberty orders, but no appellate history.