Danilina v Chernukhin & Ors

Collateral use of documents disclosed in litigation is prohibited unless the applicant establishes special circumstances amounting to a cogent reason for release. The court must examine the asserted reasons carefully and weigh the competing public interests, including the interests supporting disclosure and those supporting the statutory rights relied upon. A limited proposed use, or the absence of prejudice to the opposing party, is not by itself sufficient. The court may consider findings from related proceedings, although they are not binding, when assessing the real purpose and strength of the application.

The claimant sought permission under CPR 31.22(1)(b) to use a report, allegedly disclosed in these proceedings, in correspondence with its author and in a complaint to the Information Commissioner. She relied on rights under the Data Protection Act 1998, maintaining that the report contained inaccurate personal data.

The report had been prepared for related London arbitration proceedings between the first defendant and Mr Deripaska. The claimant’s present proceedings were funded by Mr Deripaska, and the arbitral tribunal had rejected the case advanced against the first defendant. The central issue was whether the claimant had shown special circumstances amounting to a cogent reason for lifting the collateral use prohibition.

1. Application dismissed. The claimant had not established the special and cogent reasons required for release from the collateral use prohibition in CPR 31.22(1)(b).
2. The starting point was that collateral use of disclosed documents is prohibited. Release is permitted only where special circumstances constitute a cogent reason. The court must examine the asserted reasons carefully and weigh the competing public interests, including the public interest in enforcing rights under the Data Protection Act 1998 and the public interest in ensuring that relevant evidence is disclosed so that litigation can be decided justly.
3. The claimant’s statutory rights were capable of amounting to a relevant public interest. Section 14(2) of the Data Protection Act 1998 provided a possible remedy by enabling an order that data or intelligence be supplemented by a statement of the true facts. The asserted public interest in ensuring compliance with the Act was not a separate interest from the claimant’s rights under it.
4. The court was entitled to consider the arbitral tribunal’s findings, although they were not binding on the claimant, when assessing whether the application was genuinely brought to protect her statutory rights. The timing and funding arrangements created real doubt that the claimant was the driving force behind the application and suggested that it might further Mr Deripaska’s dispute with the first defendant.
5. The additional matters relied upon did not alter the conclusion. The alleged extra layer of arbitral confidentiality did not weaken the claimant’s case on the agreed assumption that the report had been disclosed in these proceedings. The limited nature of the proposed use and the absence of prejudice to the first defendant were insufficient in themselves to justify release.

This was a first-instance application in the Commercial Court. The judgment described related arbitration proceedings and the claimant’s separate substantive proceedings, but no appeal from an earlier court decision was identified.