Bobbe v Regional Court in Bydgoszcz, Poland

Section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 requires a fact-sensitive assessment of whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive, consistently with fundamental rights. The court must consider both conditions in the requesting state and the physical process of transfer.

Formal assurances are not invariably required where the evidence shows a realistic prospect that the requested person will recover within a reasonable time and the requesting state has suitable treatment and procedural safeguards. A risk arising from transfer itself may engage Article 3 rights, but removal remains lawful where concrete, proportionate precautions eliminate serious doubts about that risk. Within the European Union, mutual trust supports a strong presumption that adequate medical care will be provided.

The appellant, who suffered from serious mental-health conditions, alcoholism and a suicide risk, appealed against an order for extradition to Poland under a European arrest warrant covering both a conviction and outstanding accusations. It was common ground that he was presently unfit to plead.

He argued that Poland should provide assurances concerning recovery of fitness to stand trial and possible civil detention, that the physical process of transfer would create an unacceptable health risk, and that extradition would be oppressive because of the suicide risk. Fresh psychiatric, Polish Judicial Authority and National Crime Agency evidence was admitted. The central issues were whether section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 required extradition to be barred or adjourned, and whether the decision in CK and others v Slovenia altered the applicable approach.

1. Appeal dismissed. Removal was not to occur before at least 21 days after the order.
2. Section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 had to be interpreted consistently with the ECHR and the Charter. Whether extradition was unjust or oppressive required an overall, fact-sensitive assessment, including the likely duration of proceedings, the requested person’s prognosis, treatment available in the requesting state, and the public interest in giving effect to extradition obligations.
3. There was no inevitable obligation to obtain a Dewani-type assurance. The evidence showed that the appellant’s condition was temporary, treatable within months, and capable of improving during the sentence he would serve in Poland. Poland had appropriate psychiatric facilities, medication, therapeutic programmes and procedures for suspending proceedings where a defendant could not participate. The Judicial Authority’s information and the principle of mutual trust provided additional support.
4. No separate assurance excluding civil detention was required. The risk was not a realistic possibility on the evidence. More generally, diversion into a civil or quasi-civil process does not necessarily remove extradition from the criminal sphere. Where permanent unfitness and inevitable civil detention are established, however, the purpose of extradition may cease to be criminal and its justification may end.
5. CK and others v Slovenia provided relevant guidance. A transfer may itself breach Article 3 ECHR or Article 4 of the Charter where serious, objective evidence establishes a real and proven risk of significant and permanent deterioration. The transferring authorities must assess all significant consequences of transfer and take appropriate measures, including medical assessment, accompaniment and care during and after transfer. The judgment did not require courts to accept uncritically a requested person’s evidence.
6. The NCA’s proposed arrangements, including a proximate fitness assessment, a Polish doctor, medical documentation, medication and continuing medical care, were capable of eliminating serious risks. The appellant’s suicide risk was therefore adequately addressed. There was no challenge to Poland’s ability or willingness to provide appropriate care after handover.

The appeal was from the decision of District Judge Brennan dated 21 March 2017 ordering extradition to Poland. Permission to appeal was granted on the section 25 ground. The High Court dismissed the appeal and directed that removal should not occur before at least 21 days after the order.