Matthew & Ors v Sedman & Ors

Where a cause of action is complete at the very beginning of a particular day, that day is included when calculating the statutory limitation period. The period therefore expires at the end of the day preceding the corresponding anniversary. The rule excluding the day on which a cause of action accrues applies where accrual occurs during the day and exclusion is needed to give the claimant the full statutory period. A claim issued after the resulting limitation date is statute-barred. Where the limitation defence succeeds on only part of a claim, summary judgment may be granted in respect of that part.

The claimants, trustees and beneficiaries of will trusts, claimed equitable compensation, damages for breach of trust and related relief against former professional trustees. The principal issue concerned an alleged failure to submit a claim under the Welcome Financial Services scheme by its bar date of 2 June 2011.

The claim form was issued on Monday 5 June 2017. The defendants contended that the cause of action accrued at the first moment of 3 June 2011 and that the six-year period expired on Friday 2 June 2017. The claimants argued that 3 June 2011 should be excluded, so that issue on 5 June 2017 was in time. The court also considered the appropriate procedural relief.

1. Limitation calculation. The cause of action accrued at the first moment of 3 June 2011, when the time for submitting a claim under the Welcome scheme expired. Where a cause of action is complete at the very beginning of a day, that day is included in calculating the statutory period. The six-year period therefore expired at the end of 2 June 2017.
2. The approach in Gelmini v Moriggia [1913] 2 KB 549 was applicable to a cause of action complete at the beginning of the first day. Marren v Dawson Bentley & Co Ltd [1961] 2 QB 135 concerned accrual during the course of a day and was distinguishable. The two decisions could be reconciled.
3. The rule that the day of accrual is excluded serves to ensure a full limitation period where accrual occurs during the day. It does not justify excluding a day on which the claimant had the entire day in which to issue proceedings. The claimants’ concerns about uncertainty and anomalies did not alter that conclusion.
4. The Welcome claim was issued out of time, whether pleaded in negligence or breach of trust. Summary judgment was appropriate under CPR 24 on the defendants’ limitation defence. The order did not extend to the separate Cattles claim, which was accepted to have been brought in time. The court did not strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a).