De La Hija v Lee

An order under CPR 3.1(7) may be revoked only through a principled exercise of discretion. The usual grounds are a material change of circumstances, a material misstatement of fact, or a manifest error in formulating the order, although the categories are not closed. A court enforcing a European Enforcement Order has no jurisdiction under Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 where no challenge was subsisting when the stay was granted. It may nevertheless use its inherent jurisdiction to stay enforcement where the certificate is manifestly deficient in formal validity. Prospects of success in challenges in the State of origin may constitute exceptional circumstances. Delay, reliance on the order and the risk of irrecoverable payment may independently justify refusing revocation.

The claimant sought under CPR 3.1(7) to revoke an order made in 2014 staying enforcement of a European Enforcement Order issued by the Burgos court in Spain. The underlying Spanish judgment concerned a substantial default judgment against the deceased, Sir Christopher Lee. The stay application had been made without notice before any Spanish challenge had been commenced.

By the time of the present application, challenges concerning service, enforcement and withdrawal of the certificate were pending before the Spanish Constitutional Court. The claimant argued that the original stay was made without jurisdiction, that relevant arguments had not been advanced, that the Spanish stay refusals constituted a material change, and that there had been a manifest error. The central issues were whether the order could be revoked and whether it should be revoked in the circumstances.

1. The application was refused. CPR 3.1(7) confers a broad power, but finality, the avoidance of two attempts at the same issue and the distinction between review and appeal require a principled restriction. The ordinary grounds are a material change of circumstances, a material misstatement of fact, or a manifest error in formulating the order. The categories are not exhaustive, and promptness is important.
2. The Master had no jurisdiction under Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 on 3 February 2014 because no challenge to the judgment or application to withdraw the certificate was then subsisting. The regulation’s wording was clear, despite the possibility of unjust results.
3. However, the enforcing court could stay enforcement under its inherent jurisdiction. Article 21(2) prevents review of the substance of the judgment or its certification, but the incomplete certificate raised issues of formal validity. The certificate did not transparently establish compliance with the minimum procedural standards and was manifestly deficient on its face.
4. The court accepted that the prospects of success in the Spanish challenges, the absence of proper service, the apparent failure to comply with the minimum standards and the weakness of the underlying claim could cumulatively amount to exceptional circumstances for Article 23(c). The Spanish Constitutional Court’s refusal of stays was based on Spanish procedural law and did not amount to a material change in circumstances relevant to the English order.
5. No material misstatement by the defendant, manifest error in formulation, or other sufficient basis for revocation was established. In any event, the court had jurisdiction under Article 23 from 20 February 2014 onwards, the circumstances continued to justify a stay, and the claimant’s nearly two-and-a-half-year delay, together with reliance and expenditure, strongly militated against revocation.

First-instance application under CPR 3.1(7). The judgment describes an earlier stay order made by Master McCloud in the Queen’s Bench Division, but no appeal from that order was determined.