Tate, R (on the application of) v Northumberland County Council

Whether a settlement is a “village” and whether development amounts to “limited infilling” under paragraph 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework are matters of planning judgement, subject to review only for legal error or irrationality. The court must not impose its own required characteristics of a village.

However, planning judgement does not remove the duty to give intelligible and adequate reasons on material and controversial issues. Where the finding of limited infilling is central to the grant of permission and differs from an earlier appeal decision concerning the same site, reasons, although brief, must be given. The absence of adequate reasons could not be cured by substituting the court’s own planning judgement under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

The claimant sought judicial review of the defendant local planning authority’s decision to grant outline permission for a dwelling in Tranwell Woods, within the Green Belt. Earlier permissions for the same development had been quashed in proceedings identified as CO/6007/2014 and CO/178/2016.

The challenge concerned whether Tranwell Woods was a “village” and whether the proposal constituted “limited infilling in a village” within paragraph 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework. The claimant also alleged irrationality, inconsistency and inadequate reasons. The central issues were the scope of planning judgement and whether the officer’s report sufficiently explained the conclusion on limited infilling.

1. Village. The conclusion that Tranwell Woods was a village for the purposes of paragraph 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework was a planning judgement based on the position on the ground. The court could not require a village to possess one or more characteristics proposed by the claimant, such as a core, services, boundaries or a particular population. The conclusion was not irrational merely because other people or authorities might have reached a different view. Descriptions of the area as open countryside or woodland were not necessarily inconsistent with its being a village.
2. Limited infilling. Whether the proposal constituted limited infilling was likewise a matter of planning judgement. The planning committee was not bound by the earlier planning inspector’s decision concerning the same site, and could reach a different conclusion. Nevertheless, limited infilling was material and central to the grant of permission. The officer’s report gave no adequate reasons for that conclusion, particularly in light of the earlier contrary decision. Reasons could be brief, but the report had to explain the principal controversial issue.
3. Very special circumstances. The report did not clearly invite the committee to consider, in the alternative, whether the development was inappropriate development in the Green Belt and whether very special circumstances justified it under paragraphs 87 and 88 of the National Planning Policy Framework. The reference to matters outweighing harm appeared in the context of the conclusion that the paragraph 89 exception applied. It could not preserve the decision.
4. Section 31(2A). The court could not conclude that the outcome would highly likely have been the same, because doing so would require the court to decide for itself whether the proposal was limited infilling. That was a planning judgement for the committee, not the court.
5. The decision was quashed.

The judgment records that earlier grants of permission for the same development had been quashed by the High Court in proceedings identified as CO/6007/2014 and CO/178/2016. The present judicial review concerned the subsequent redetermination.