Wood v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

For the exception for limited infilling in villages in paragraph 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework, whether a proposal is in a village is a matter of planning judgment based on the position on the ground. A village boundary defined in a local plan is relevant but is not necessarily determinative.

The words requiring policies set out in the Local Plan qualify the separate exception for limited affordable housing for local community needs. They do not qualify limited infilling in villages. An inspector who treats the defined local-plan boundary as conclusive therefore misdirects himself.

The claimant sought outline planning permission for one dwelling on land beside a public house at Shorne, within the Green Belt. The local planning authority refused permission and a planning inspector dismissed the claimant’s appeal under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

The claimant then applied under section 288 of that Act to quash the inspector’s decision. The Administrative Court dismissed the challenge based on paragraph 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework, but declared that the inspector had inadequately addressed the housing-land shortfall. It declined to quash the decision: [2014] EWHC 683 (Admin).

The appeal concerned whether the inspector had wrongly treated the local-plan village boundary as determinative of whether the proposal was limited infilling in a village.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Justice Sullivan, with whom Lord Justice Bean and Lady Justice King agreed, held that the inspector had misdirected himself on the first ground. The inspector’s decision was quashed.

2. Paragraph 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework treats new buildings in the Green Belt as inappropriate unless an exception applies. Its exception for limited infilling in villages is distinct from the exception for limited affordable housing for local community needs. The words concerning policies set out in the Local Plan govern the latter exception only.

3. Whether development is limited infilling in a village is a matter of planning judgment. It depends upon the inspector’s assessment of the position on the ground. A village boundary defined in a local plan is relevant, but cannot conclusively determine that question where it does not accord with the inspector’s assessment of the settlement’s extent on the ground.

4. On a fair reading of the decision letter, the inspector had contrasted the built-up area as it appeared on the ground with the defined village boundary. Despite recognising that the site appeared to be an infill location surrounded by development, he concluded that it was not in a village solely because it lay outside that defined boundary. That was an unlawful application of paragraph 89.

5. It was unnecessary to decide the second ground concerning the housing-land shortfall. The court set aside the relevant paragraph of the Administrative Court’s order and ordered the second respondent to pay the claimant’s costs at first instance from 30 January 2014 and the costs of the appeal, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal and quashed the planning inspector’s decision: [2015] EWCA Civ 195.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Dismissed the challenge to the inspector’s interpretation of paragraph 89, declared inadequate reasons concerning housing supply, but declined to quash the decision: [2014] EWHC 683 (Admin).
• Planning inspector: Dismissed the claimant’s section 78 appeal against refusal of outline planning permission.