Craig v Farriers Registration Council

An appeal from a professional disciplinary decision is ordinarily by way of review. The appellate court may correct material factual errors, while giving appropriate weight to the tribunal’s advantage in hearing oral evidence. A tribunal may accept part of a witness’s evidence while rejecting other allegations, provided it explains its approach and considers each charge separately.

Sanctions must serve the public interest and be proportionate to the regulatory objectives of the profession. The specialist tribunal’s expertise attracts respect, but only within the proper scope of that expertise. Where misconduct concerns an ancillary professional role, the tribunal must consider whether a restriction on that role would adequately protect the public before imposing the more severe sanction of removal from the professional register.

This was an appeal under section 15(3) of the Farriers (Registration) Act 1975 against findings of serious professional misconduct and a direction by the Disciplinary Committee of the Farriers Registration Council that the appellant’s name be removed from the register.

The allegations concerned the appellant’s treatment of an apprentice, including bullying, harassment, failures concerning pay and protective equipment, and inadequate support for theoretical training. The appeal challenged the Committee’s factual findings, its use of findings made in earlier disciplinary proceedings, and the proportionality and legality of the sanction.

1. Appeal by way of review. CPR 52.10 and 52.11 applied. The question was whether the Committee’s decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. Appropriate deference was required where findings depended on oral testimony, although material errors of fact could be corrected.
2. The Committee was entitled to accept the apprentice’s evidence on some allegations while rejecting or being unsure about others. The criminal standard of proof required each charge to be considered separately. The Committee’s findings on credibility and the other witnesses were adequately reasoned and were not shown to be wrong.
3. The finding that the appellant had failed to pay the apprentice for August 2012 was flawed. The Committee failed to consider evidence capable of showing that payment might have been made in cash. That finding, and the related finding of misconduct, were set aside.
4. The findings made in the appellant’s earlier disciplinary proceedings were final for the purposes of cause of action estoppel and were conclusive evidence of the facts found. In any event, they were admissible evidence of previous conduct. The Committee was entitled to use them in assessing character, credibility, propensity and sanction, although the considerable lapse of time reduced their aggravating force.
5. The Committee had power, following a finding of misconduct, to take steps or make recommendations which might result in loss of Approved Training Farrier status without removal from the register. It had failed to consider that less severe and potentially sufficient outcome. Given the statutory purpose of protecting horses and the particular expertise of the Committee, removal from the register was disproportionate on the facts.
6. The appeal therefore succeeded as to Charge 7 and sanction. The direction removing the appellant’s name from the register was set aside. The matter was remitted to the Disciplinary Committee to reconsider sanction, including the effect and deterrent value of removal as an Approved Training Farrier and any mitigation advanced by the appellant. The remaining findings and grounds of appeal were dismissed.

High Court (Administrative Court): appeal under section 15(3) of the Farriers (Registration) Act 1975 allowed in part. The finding relating to Charge 7 and the sanction of removal from the register were set aside. The sanction issue was remitted to the Disciplinary Committee.