Andrew Bagnall v The Farriers Registration Council

An appeal from a professional disciplinary decision under section 15 of the Farriers (Registration) Act 1975 is by way of review. The court may intervene where the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.

Findings of primary fact, particularly those based on oral evidence, attract substantial deference. They may be overturned only where, after appropriate caution, they are unreasonable and unsustainable. Sanction is an evaluative judgment by the specialist tribunal and may be disturbed only for an error of principle or where it falls outside the permissible range. The civil standard remains the balance of probabilities; serious allegations do not require a heightened standard of proof.

A disciplinary committee found that a registered farrier had repeatedly kicked and punched a tethered pony after it had bitten him. It found serious misconduct and directed removal from the register, with no application for restoration for 12 months.

The farrier appealed to the High Court against both the factual finding and the sanction. He argued that the committee had misunderstood his case, applied the wrong approach to proof, relied on unjustified inferences and inadequately considered injury, mitigation, risk and an historic reprimand. The central issues were whether the finding of kicking was sustainable on review and whether removal from the register was an impermissible sanction.

1. Appeal dismissed. The committee’s finding that the appellant kicked and then punched the pony was a finding of primary fact. The appeal was by way of review under CPR rule 52.21(1), but for findings based on oral evidence there was little practical difference from a rehearing. The court had to decide whether the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.
2. The appellate court must be slow to interfere with primary findings, while recognising that they are not unassailable. Intervention is justified only where, having allowed for the tribunal’s advantages in hearing the witnesses and considering the evidence, the finding is unreasonable and unsustainable. The committee had adequately explained why it accepted the evidence of the witnesses and rejected the allegation of deliberate fabrication.
3. The committee was entitled to consider the timing and content of the report to the veterinary practice, the pony’s reported response and the appellant’s departure without payment as matters supporting the witnesses’ account and making fabrication less likely. Those matters were not treated as direct proof of kicking, but as relevant to reliability. The appellant could not advance on appeal a criticism of evidence which had not been raised before the committee.
4. The balance of probabilities remained the applicable standard. The seriousness of an allegation did not require cogent evidence as a distinct standard. The fact-finder had instead to consider the inherent improbability of the conduct alleged and the particular circumstances as a whole. The committee therefore committed no error in asking whether kicking was more likely than deliberate fabrication.
5. The committee’s reference to paragraph 24 of the Code of Conduct did not affect its factual finding and did not show a material misreading. Its conclusion that kicking and punching the pony amounted to serious misconduct was an evaluative judgment within the range reasonably open to it.
6. Removal from the register was also an evaluative judgment by a specialist disciplinary body. The committee was entitled to consider deliberate harm, some resulting injury, limited insight, future risk, the presence of a child, the impact on professional reputation and the available mitigation. The evidential strength of the factual case was irrelevant once the facts had been found proved.
7. There was no material error of principle and the sanction was not outside the permissible range. The appeal was dismissed.

The judgment describes an appeal from a Disciplinary Committee of the Farriers Registration Council. The committee had found serious misconduct proved and directed removal from the register, subject to a 12-month restriction on restoration applications. The High Court dismissed the appeal.