Norkowski v District Court in Bydoszcz, Poland District Court In Torun, Poland Regional Court In Slupsk, Poland

On an appeal against an extradition decision, substantial delay does not by itself make extradition unjust or oppressive. The relevant question is whether the delay caused significant prejudice to the requested person’s ability to defend the case or such a change in circumstances that extradition would cause significant hardship. An appellate court should usually avoid interfering with the first-instance evaluation of competing factors, particularly where it depends on findings from oral evidence. Under Article 8 ECHR, the interests of children are a primary consideration, but family hardship must reach the high threshold identified in the relevant authorities before extradition becomes disproportionate.

The appellant challenged an order made by District Judge Inyundo on 20 September 2016 directing his extradition to Poland under three European Arrest Warrants. The first and third warrants concerned accusations of fraud, forgery and swindling. The second concerned convictions and suspended sentences for fraud and theft-related offending.

For the first and third warrants, the appellant relied on section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 and Article 8 ECHR. For the second warrant, he relied only on Article 8. He argued that delay, the effect on his ability to defend himself, changes in his family circumstances and the impact on his partner and children made extradition unjust, oppressive or disproportionate.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge’s order for extradition under all three European Arrest Warrants was upheld.
2. Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, extradition is unjust where the passage of time has caused significant prejudice to the requested person if tried in the requesting state. It is oppressive where delay has produced such a change in circumstances that extradition would cause significant hardship. The principles stated in Kakis v Government of Cyprus, [1978] 1WLR 779, La Torre v Government of Italy, [2007] EWHC 1370, and Gomes and Goodyer v Trinidad and Tobago, [2009]1 WLR 21, were applied.
3. The District Judge had considered the substantial delays, the appellant’s proposed duress defence, his changed circumstances and the hardship to his family. His conclusion that the appellant could present his defence without undue difficulty was open to him. Delay alone did not make extradition unjust or oppressive.
4. The Article 8 assessment was governed by Norris v Government of the United States of America (No.2), [2010]UKSC 9, HH V Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa, [2012]UKSC 25, and Celinski and others v Polish Judicial Authorities, [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin). The children’s interests were a primary consideration. The offences were serious, fugitive status was relevant to the delay concerning the second warrant, and there was a significant public interest in honouring extradition obligations. The family impact did not reach the severity required to make extradition disproportionate.
5. The court did not decide whether extradition under one warrant could be treated as a factor supporting extradition under other warrants. The District Judge had considered each warrant separately, and that approach was sufficient to determine the appeal. The submission based on Zengota v The Circuit Court of Zielona Gora, Poland and others, [2017] EWHC 191(Admin), therefore did not require resolution.

• District Judge: On 20 September 2016, District Judge Inyundo ordered the appellant’s extradition to Poland under three European Arrest Warrants.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was dismissed and the extradition order upheld.