Chanda v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Under the Immigration Rules, paragraph 322(1A) provides an independent ground for mandatory refusal where a false document is submitted. The applicant’s knowledge of the falsity is immaterial. A separate finding of personal deception must be addressed where relied on because paragraph 320(7B) carries additional future consequences. Falsity alone does not invariably prove personal deception: a third party may have forged a document without the applicant’s knowledge. However, knowing reliance on a document containing a statement the applicant knows to be false, combined with a bare denial and no supporting account, can establish deception. Where the evidence is complete, an appellate court may determine the issue itself rather than remit it.

The appellant applied for further leave to remain as a Tier 2 Skilled Worker, relying on a purported University of London degree certificate. The University confirmed that the certificate was not genuine and that it could not trace any graduation record for the appellant. The Secretary of State refused the application under the Immigration Rules paragraph 322(1A) and separately found deception, engaging paragraph 320(7B). The First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeals. The Court of Appeal considered whether falsity was proved, whether personal deception had separately been established, whether the matter should be remitted, and whether an Article 8 point could be considered.

Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Coulson delivered the judgment, with which Lord Justice Floyd agreed.

1. Paragraph 322(1A) creates a ground of mandatory refusal based on the submission of a false document. The applicant’s knowledge of the falsity is immaterial. This was consistent with AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 773 and JK (India) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1080. The court rejected any approach, suggested in R (Ali Ahmed Agha) v SSHD [2017] UKUT 00121 (IAC), which blurred the distinction between a false document and personal deception.
2. The respondent proved that the certificate was false through the University’s confirmation of its discrepancies, lack of authenticity and absence of any graduation record. The appellant’s bare denial and failure to provide contrary evidence did not displace that conclusion.
3. The separate finding of deception had to be addressed independently because it engaged paragraph 320(7B) and its future immigration consequences. A false document may have been forged by a third party without the applicant’s knowledge. In this case, however, the appellant knew that he had not been an internal student at the University of London, relied on a certificate asserting that he had been, and gave no credible account or evidence of the alleged course of study. Dishonesty was therefore established.
4. The First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal should have expressly addressed the separate deception finding. Remittal was unnecessary because this was the third appeal, the appellant had been allowed to submit a recent witness statement, and the evidence was sufficient for the Court of Appeal to reach its own conclusion.
5. The Article 8 argument had not been pursued in the Upper Tribunal and was outside the permission granted for the appeal. It therefore could not properly arise. In any event, the court observed that nine years’ residence alone did not outweigh the dishonest application.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2018] EWCA Civ 2424. Appeal dismissed.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): Decision dated 30 January 2017 dismissed the appeal.
• First-tier Tribunal: Decision dated 19 April 2016 rejected the appeal.