Davis v Watford Borough Council

Section 204A(1) of the Housing Act 1996 gives the County Court jurisdiction over challenges to interim-accommodation decisions only where the applicant has a right to appeal against an actual decision on a review. It does not extend to a case where the authority has made no decision on the review, even though section 204(1)(b) may permit an appeal against the original decision. A challenge in that situation remains a matter for judicial review in the High Court. Purposive considerations cannot justify rewriting plain statutory language, particularly where the statutory scheme rationally leaves other interim-accommodation challenges to judicial review.

The appellant applied for homelessness assistance and was found not to be in priority need. He requested a review, but the local authority had not notified a review decision when it refused to provide interim accommodation. He commenced judicial review proceedings in the High Court.

Mitting J held that the County Court had jurisdiction under section 204A, refused permission for judicial review and discharged an interim accommodation order. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether section 204A(1) applied where no review decision had been made, despite the possible appeal route under section 204(1)(b). The issue had become academic for the appellant but was allowed to proceed because of its wider importance.

Appeal allowed. The proceedings had properly been commenced as judicial review proceedings in the High Court.

1. Section 204A(1) must be read in the context of section 204, but its words naturally refer to an applicant’s right to appeal against a local housing authority’s decision on a review. The word decision cannot naturally include a situation where no decision has been made.
2. Section 204(1)(b) may cover a decision made within time but not notified, and a failure to make a decision within the prescribed time. That does not expand section 204A(1), which does not link to section 204(1)(b). Where no review decision exists, the substantive appeal is against the original decision.
3. The purposive argument was insufficient to justify rewriting section 204A(1). Section 11 of the Homelessness Act 2002 had the purpose of reducing the High Court’s burden, but the statutory materials did not establish that every interim-accommodation challenge was intended to fall within the County Court’s jurisdiction.
4. The existence of other situations in which judicial review remains appropriate supported the literal reading. These included refusals under section 188(3), failure to produce a review decision, and certain challenges concerning time limits. The observations in Francis v Kensington and Chelsea LBC [2003] EWCA Civ 443 and Johnson v Westminster City Council [2013] EWCA Civ 773 were consistent with that allocation of jurisdiction.
5. Accordingly, where interim accommodation is refused under section 204(4) before any decision on the review has been made, the challenge is brought by judicial review in the High Court. The parties were directed to seek agreement on the appropriate Minute of Order.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was allowed. The court held that the challenge had properly been brought by judicial review in the High Court: [2018] EWCA Civ 529.
• High Court, Administrative Court: On 5 November 2015, Mitting J held that the County Court had jurisdiction under section 204A, refused permission for judicial review and discharged an interim accommodation order.
• Court of Appeal, permission stage: On 19 May 2016, Longmore LJ granted permission for judicial review and directed that the claim be retained in the Court of Appeal for substantive determination.