C (Children)

For the disregard in Children Act 1989, section 105(6)(b), to apply, the child must have lived in a place in accordance with a requirement of a supervision order. A supervision order does not trigger the disregard merely because it exists. The order must contain a relevant requirement, such as one requiring the child to live at a specified place under Schedule 3, paragraph 2(1)(a). Where no such requirement is included, the period of residence is counted in determining ordinary residence. A child’s permanent residence with a parent under a child arrangements order may therefore establish ordinary residence in that location.

At the conclusion of care proceedings, the Family Court designated Wakefield District Council as the local authority under the care orders. The children had previously moved from Yorkshire to live with their father in Dorset under a child arrangements order, accompanied by a supervision order in standard terms. They were later accommodated by Dorset County Council and eventually returned to Yorkshire.

The judge treated the supervision order itself as sufficient to engage the disregard in section 105(6)(b), with the consequence that the children’s ordinary residence was treated as remaining in Yorkshire. Wakefield appealed. Both local authorities supported changing the designation to Dorset. The central issue was whether the supervision order contained a relevant requirement for the purposes of section 105(6)(b).

1. Appeal allowed. The care orders were amended so that Dorset County Council was the designated local authority.
2. Section 105(6)(b) of the Children Act 1989 requires the disregard of a period only where the child lives in a place in accordance with the requirements of a supervision order. The existence of a supervision order, without more, is insufficient.
3. Schedule 3, paragraphs 2 and 3, confirms that a supervision order may contain requirements affecting residence. In particular, paragraph 2(1)(a) permits directions requiring the child to live at a specified place for a specified period. The statutory scheme therefore distinguishes between a supervision order containing such a requirement and a bare supervision order.
4. The supervision order made in the present case contained no additional direction or requirement. It supported the children’s placement with their father in Dorset but did not require them to live there or dictate that they remain there. Section 105(6)(b) was therefore not engaged.
5. The children’s permanent residence with their father under the child arrangements order, from December 2016 until the middle of 2017, represented their ordinary residence. They were consequently ordinarily resident in Dorset when Dorset issued the care proceedings. The court did not decide the alternative suggestion that the children had no ordinary residence at the relevant time.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2018] EWCA Civ 900: allowed Wakefield District Council’s appeal and directed that the care orders identify Dorset County Council as the designated local authority.
• Bournemouth and Poole Family Court: on 20 November 2017, Judge Dancey designated Wakefield District Council, reasoning that the supervision order stopped the ordinary-residence period before the children moved to Dorset. On 7 December 2017, the judge held that he had no jurisdiction to reconsider the final order.