Hobbs & Anor v R. (Rev 1)

When sentencing an offender who was under 18 when the offence was committed, the court must give real weight to youth, emotional and developmental maturity, and the effect of immaturity on culpability. Reaching 18 is not a sentencing cliff edge.

In manslaughter, death makes harm exceptionally serious, but culpability depends on the conduct, the harm reasonably foreseen, and the offender’s maturity. A reckless prank with tragic consequences may nonetheless fall at a relatively low level of culpability. Evidence of a co-defendant’s unproven and materially different alleged offending does not have substantial probative value merely because it is said to show propensity or undermine credibility.

Hobbs and DM, who were respectively 17 and just over 15 when the offences were committed, were convicted at the Crown Court at Chelmsford of the manslaughter of Vilson Meshi and theft. A lit marine distress flare had been thrown into Mr Meshi’s car while he slept inside; toxic fumes caused his death.

Hobbs renewed her application for leave to appeal against conviction. She challenged the exclusion of further bad-character evidence concerning DM. Both appellants appealed their sentences for manslaughter, contending that the judge had not adequately reflected their youth, immaturity and differing personal circumstances. The central sentencing issue was the proper approach to young offenders who commit manslaughter before, but are sentenced after, their eighteenth birthdays.

1. The court refused Hobbs’s renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction. The trial judge had properly excluded the proposed further bad-character evidence under section 101(1)(e) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The allegations against DM were unproven and untested, related to wholly different offending, and had limited probative value. Their admission would have required an impermissible satellite trial. In any event, the evidence against Hobbs was very strong and her conviction was safe.

2. The sentencing appeals were allowed. The youth sentencing guidance required an individualised assessment centred on rehabilitation, welfare, age, emotional and developmental maturity, and the effect of those matters on culpability. An offender’s eighteenth birthday is not a sentencing cliff edge. The judge had insufficiently considered that Hobbs was 17 when she committed the single act and that the enterprise had been undertaken for fun.

3. Although death always represents very serious harm in manslaughter, culpability had to reflect the harm these appellants should reasonably have foreseen. They expected the sleeping occupant to wake and leave the car. They could foresee smoke, fumes, some injury and possible injury while escaping, but not the exceptional heat and toxicity of a marine flare. The offending was therefore at a relatively low level of culpability despite its dreadful consequence.

4. Nine years’ detention for Hobbs was excessive even for an adult on these facts. Her sentence for manslaughter was reduced to five years’ detention in a young offenders’ institution. DM’s youth, cognitive and developmental difficulties, and progress in custody justified a sentence of three years and six months’ detention.

5. Applying R v Mills [1998] 2 Cr App R(S) 128, the court quashed DM’s concurrent theft sentence because no separate penalty could be imposed for an offence outside section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 when detention under that provision had been imposed. Appropriate victim surcharge orders were made.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — in [2018] EWCA Crim 1003, refused Hobbs’s renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction, allowed both sentence appeals, reduced the manslaughter sentences, and quashed DM’s concurrent theft sentence.
• Crown Court at Chelmsford — HHJ Lynch QC convicted both appellants of manslaughter and theft on 24 August 2017. Hobbs received nine years’ detention for manslaughter; DM received six years’ detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.