Thurlwell, R v

An application for permission to appeal may be dismissed summarily under section 20 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 where it is frivolous and can be determined without a full hearing. An allegation that police were unlawfully present does not establish an abuse of process where entry was consented to and a fair trial remained possible. A complaint about non-recording of consent may raise other issues, but does not negate consent.

Following a guilty plea on an agreed basis, fresh evidence that contradicts that basis is not admissible on appeal without an identified legal basis. Complaints concerning co-defendants or evidence that could no longer affect an order did not disclose an arguable sentencing ground.

The applicant pleaded guilty at Leeds Crown Court on 28 October 2016 to being in charge of a dog which was dangerously out of control. He received a suspended sentence with requirements, and the dog was ordered to be destroyed.

He sought permission to appeal against conviction and sentence. His grounds alleged abuse of process arising from the police officers’ presence at his home, challenged the destruction order, raised matters concerning the dog’s owners, and sought to adduce witness evidence despite the agreed basis of plea.

The application was referred to the full Court of Appeal for possible summary determination under section 20 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

1. The application for permission to appeal was dismissed summarily. The court held that it was frivolous and could be determined without a full hearing, satisfying the conditions for summary dismissal under section 20 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

2. The proposed conviction ground was unarguable. The applicant had consented to the police entering the premises. Even if that consent had not been recorded in accordance with relevant codes of practice, that did not remove the fact of consent. There was no misuse of court process and a fair trial was possible. Further, the applicant had pleaded guilty and had not sought to vacate that plea.

3. No arguable ground against sentence was identified. The sentencing judge had found that the dog presented a danger to public safety and ordered its destruction under section 4(1)(a) of the Dangerous Dogs Act. A later behavioural assessment could not now provide a sentencing ground because the dog had been destroyed.

4. The applicant could not advance a complaint on behalf of the dog’s owners concerning a submission of no case to answer. Any such submission could only have been made at trial. The remaining suggested issue depended on factual matters and was unsuitable for summary determination.

5. The proposed witness evidence contradicted aspects of the agreed basis of plea, and no basis for its admission on appeal was identified. Expressions of unhappiness about the dog’s fate did not make that evidence admissible.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2018] EWCA Crim 1215, dismissed the application for permission to appeal against conviction and sentence by summary determination.

• Crown Court at Leeds: On 28 October 2016, the applicant pleaded guilty to being in charge of a dog which was dangerously out of control. He received a suspended sentence with requirements, a victim surcharge order, and an order for destruction of the dog.