Petgrave, R v

Duress of circumstances is raised only by evidence capable of showing that the accused acted from a reasonably based fear of death or serious injury. It cannot be put in issue merely by submissions from counsel, and prosecution evidence which supplies only a possible foundation for the defence does not itself require the prosecution to disprove it.

Once the defence is raised, the jury must decide both the accused’s reasonable belief and whether a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the accused’s characteristics, might have acted similarly. A judge must not determine one stage of that factual inquiry for the jury.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Inner London of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988. He admitted dangerous driving and causation, but contended that he drove on the pavement because armed men were pursuing him.

At the close of the prosecution case, the trial judge rejected a submission of no case to answer. The appellant subsequently gave evidence and the judge directed the jury, by written questions, on duress of circumstances. The appellant appealed against conviction, arguing that the prosecution evidence had already established the subjective limb of the defence and that only the objective limb should have been left to the jury.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction was safe. The trial judge correctly rejected the submission of no case to answer and correctly left all stages of the defence to the jury.
2. Duress of circumstances may in principle provide a defence to an offence under section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The relevant issues are those stated in R v Martin (1989) 88 Cr App R 343: whether the accused acted because of a reasonably based fear of death or serious injury, and whether a sober person of reasonable firmness sharing the accused’s characteristics might have responded similarly.
3. The prosecution evidence did not itself raise the defence. It showed earlier threats and an armed pursuit, but did not establish why the appellant drove on the pavement, whether he was in fear, or whether fear compelled his dangerous driving. A defendant cannot put duress of circumstances in issue through counsel alone. Once the appellant gave evidence, the defence was raised and the prosecution bore the burden of disproving it.
4. There may rarely be a case in which prosecution evidence alone raises duress so conclusively that no reasonable jury could find it disproved. This was not such a case. The judge’s comments at the no-case stage did not withdraw the first question from the jury. Each stage of the Martin approach remained a factual matter for the jury, and the written questions properly provided a structured route to their decision.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): By [2018] EWCA Crim 1397, dismissed the appeal against conviction and upheld the conviction.
• Crown Court at Inner London: Following a jury trial before His Honour Judge Seed QC, convicted the appellant of causing serious injury by dangerous driving.