Williams, R v

A Lucas direction is usually required where a jury may treat a statement which it is sure is a lie as evidence of guilt, but the lie may reasonably have an explanation other than guilt. The defendant need not have admitted the lie.

No such direction is required where the case turns solely on the jury's assessment of two conflicting accounts and there is no evidential basis for an innocent explanation of any false account. Where separately charged offences form one admissible course of conduct, the jury may consider the evidence of the whole incident when assessing credibility on a disputed count.

The defendant pleaded guilty at Cardiff Crown Court to assault occasioning actual bodily harm and criminal damage arising from an incident involving his partner, X. He was tried and convicted of sexual assault. The only issues at trial were whether he touched X on or close to her genital area and whether the touching was sexual; consent was not in issue.

He appealed his sexual-assault conviction, contending principally that the judge should have given a Lucas direction and should have warned the jury against using his admitted guilt of the other offences to convict him of sexual assault. He also alleged that the judge's conduct rendered the trial unfair.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was wrong to state that a Lucas direction is confined to admitted lies. The relevant question is whether a statement which the jury is sure is a lie may nevertheless be explained by something other than guilt. A direction will usually be necessary where the jury may treat such a lie as probative of guilt.

2. On the facts, however, no direction was required. The case turned wholly on the jury's assessment of X's and the defendant's conflicting accounts of the incident. There was no separate lie whose evidential significance required the suggested safeguard. The proposed explanation that the defendant might have lied about the extent of the physical assault because he awaited sentence had no evidential foundation and would have been unrealistic and unhelpful.

3. The judge properly directed the jury that it could consider the evidence concerning the assault when deciding where the truth lay on the sexual-assault count. Although separately charged, the alleged sexual assault formed part of the same course of conduct, prompted by the defendant's admitted sexual jealousy. The whole incident was admissible evidence and formed part of the defence account. No additional direction was needed that guilt of assault did not itself establish guilt of sexual assault: that was clear from the separate trial and the modified good-character direction.

4. The complaints concerning judicial conduct were unarguable. Robust exchanges with counsel occurred outside the jury's presence, the judge's directions on the respective functions of judge and jury were impeccable, and the correction of an immaterial point in counsel's closing speech could not affect the trial's fairness.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2018] EWCA Crim 1986, dismissed the defendant's appeal against conviction for sexual assault.
• Cardiff Crown Court: The defendant pleaded guilty to assault occasioning actual bodily harm and criminal damage, was convicted of sexual assault on 21 November 2017, and was sentenced on 11 December 2017.