Wallace, R v

In a homicide case, the question of legal causation is ordinarily for the jury. The defendant’s unlawful conduct need not be the sole, main, or substantial cause of death. It is enough if it remained an operating cause which made a significant contribution.

A victim’s request for lawful voluntary euthanasia abroad, and doctors’ act in carrying it out, do not necessarily break the chain of causation. Where the request is a direct response to the enduring and unbearable consequences of injuries deliberately inflicted by the defendant, a jury may find that those injuries remained a legally effective cause of death. The assessment is fact-sensitive and made by common sense.

The prosecution appealed under Criminal Justice Act 2003 against a terminating ruling and two evidential rulings made during the respondent’s trial at Bristol Crown Court.

The respondent was charged with murder and with throwing sulphuric acid with intent. The prosecution case was that the acid attack left the victim permanently paralysed, disfigured, and in constant physical and psychological suffering. He later requested euthanasia in Belgium, where it was lawfully carried out.

The trial judge ruled that the victim’s request and the Belgian doctors’ actions were independent, free and voluntary acts which broke the chain of causation, and withdrew murder from the jury. The central issue was whether a properly directed jury could instead find that the attack remained a legally sufficient cause of death.

1. The prosecution’s appeal against the terminating ruling was allowed. The appeal against the two evidential rulings was dismissed. A new trial on the murder count was ordered.

2. The trial judge had wrongly treated the victim’s request for euthanasia and the doctors’ act as necessarily severing legal causation. The proper issue was whether the respondent’s deliberate acid attack remained an operating and significant cause of death. A cause need not be the sole, main, or substantial cause, provided it contributes more than minimally.

3. On the prosecution evidence, the victim’s unbearable suffering, permanent paralysis and request for euthanasia were directly connected to the injuries inflicted by the respondent. The victim had no relevant pre-existing suicidal tendency. He remained gravely affected by the injuries until his death. A jury could therefore find that his request and the doctors’ lawful conduct were a direct response to the circumstances created by the attack, rather than independent acts of free and unfettered volition.

4. Compliance with the Belgian Act on Euthanasia of 28 May 2002 did not determine the distinct question of causation in English criminal law. Nor did the doctors’ freedom under Article 14 to refuse euthanasia preclude a finding that the respondent’s conduct remained causative.

5. The court indicated that the retrial jury should determine causation by common sense. It should consider whether the injuries were a significant and operating cause of death and whether the victim’s decision fell within the range of responses reasonably foreseeable from a victim in his position.

6. The judge was entitled to exclude the disputed medical hearsay and the psychiatric opinion. The proposed evidence risked unfair prejudice and confusion, particularly because medical and psychiatric material from Belgium was unavailable.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the prosecution appeal against the terminating ruling, dismissed the appeals against the evidential rulings, and ordered a new trial.
• Crown Court at Bristol: May J withdrew the murder count from the jury after holding that the victim’s request for euthanasia and the Belgian doctors’ actions broke the chain of causation. She also made the two evidential rulings challenged by the prosecution.