A, R. v

Where dangerous driving is alleged to have caused death or serious injury following a later collision, legal causation does not require reasonable foreseeability of the precise sequence in which that collision occurred. It is enough that a collision of the general kind, and the resulting risk of harm, could sensibly have been anticipated.

A later driver’s conduct does not necessarily break the chain of causation merely because its exact form was unforeseeable. Whether an unlit vehicle left on a motorway hard shoulder created a foreseeable collision risk is ordinarily a question for the jury.

The prosecution appealed under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 against a Crown Court terminating ruling.

The respondent was charged jointly with another driver with causing death by dangerous driving and causing serious injury by dangerous driving. Her car had been stationary, unlit, on the hard shoulder of the M1 when the co-accused’s lorry crossed the carriageway and collided with it. One passenger died and others were seriously injured.

The trial judge held that dangerousness was for the jury, but ruled that the lorry driver’s conduct broke the chain of causation and that there was no case to answer. The central issue was whether causation required foreseeability of the particular circumstances in which the later collision occurred.

1. The prosecution appeal was allowed. The terminating ruling adopted an unduly confined approach to legal causation. A fresh trial was ordered on count 1.

2. The court applied the jury direction proposed in Girdler [2009] EWCA Crim 2666. Where a defendant’s dangerous driving is more than a slight or trifling link to a death caused by a later collision, the jury must decide whether a fatal collision could sensibly have been anticipated in the relevant circumstances.

3. The relevant inquiry does not require foreseeability of the particular chain of events or the exact manner of the intervening conduct. It is sufficient that the general form of the intervening act and the risk of further harm were reasonably foreseeable. The court regarded that approach as consistent with R. v Maybin [2012] 2 SCR 30 and with the proposed direction in Wallace (Berlinah) [2018] EWCA Crim 690.

4. On the prosecution evidence, a jury could properly conclude that leaving an unlit car on a motorway hard shoulder for about 15 minutes in the early morning created a foreseeable risk that another vehicle might collide with it and, if it was occupied, cause death or serious injury. The court therefore held, under section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, that the ruling was wrong in law or involved an error of principle. Pursuant to section 61(4)(b), it ordered a fresh trial on count 1.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The prosecution’s appeal under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was allowed. The court held that the Crown Court had erred in its approach to causation and ordered a fresh trial on count 1.
• Crown Court: At the close of the prosecution case, the trial judge rejected a submission that dangerousness could not be left to the jury, but upheld a submission of no case to answer on causation. An earlier paper application to dismiss the charges had been refused.