Laker-Jones & Anor, R. v

A defendant is not entitled to enhanced credit for a guilty plea merely because the indictment was amended shortly before trial. The question is whether the amendment created a material difference that gave the defendant a sensible reason not to plead earlier.

When sentencing an incomplete conspiracy, the court must make a downward adjustment to reflect that the planned offence was not carried out. Serious and relevant antecedents may, however, outweigh that reduction. An extended sentence may properly follow where the current offence and extensive convictions establish dangerousness.

The appellant, Laker-Jones, appealed his nine-year sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. Douglas renewed his application for permission to appeal against an extended sentence of 13 years, comprising nine years’ custody and a four-year licence extension.

Both had pleaded guilty on the first day of trial after the indictment was amended to add conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. They contended that they should have received more than 10 per cent credit. Douglas also challenged the categorisation of the offence, the treatment of the uncompleted conspiracy, and the finding that he was dangerous.

The central issue was whether the amended count made the first day of trial the first realistic opportunity to plead guilty, and whether any sentencing error was arguable.

1. The appeal was dismissed and Douglas’s renewed application for permission to appeal was refused. The court also made a 28-day loss of time order against Douglas.

2. The addition of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary did not justify greater credit for Laker-Jones’s plea. On these facts, a plea to that offence necessarily accepted that the hammer would be used as a weapon if necessary. There was no material difference between that allegation and the existing conspiracy to rob count, and no sensible reason why the appellant could not have pleaded earlier. A 10 per cent reduction was therefore appropriate.

3. The sentencing judge had correctly taken account of R v Khan [2013] EWCA Crim 800 by reducing the sentence to reflect that the conspiracy was incomplete. Douglas’s extensive previous convictions, including for dishonesty and violence, were a substantial aggravating feature and would at least have balanced any further reduction based on the incomplete nature of the offending.

4. The categorisation of the aggravated-burglary conspiracy as category 1 was correct. The plan involved a very large intended theft, a weapon, significant planning and organisation, and the deliberate targeting of an occupier by a group. The court found no error in the conclusion that Douglas was dangerous. His antecedents and the present offending justified the extended sentence imposed under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 226 A.

5. Applying R v Grey and others, the court held that a loss of time or costs order was the appropriate means of deterring wholly unmeritorious applications that consume appellate resources. A 28-day loss of time order was made.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2018] EWCA Crim 693, dismissed Laker-Jones’s sentence appeal and refused Douglas permission to appeal on renewal.
• Single judge: Refused Douglas permission to appeal, giving reasons later endorsed by the full court.
• Sentencing court: On 18 July 2017, imposed nine years’ imprisonment on Laker-Jones and an extended sentence of 13 years on Douglas following guilty pleas.