Miah v British Broadcasting Corporation

Meaning in a defamation claim is determined by the broad impression made on the hypothetical reasonable reader or viewer, considering the publication as a whole and its context. The court should avoid elaborate linguistic analysis and should not select a defamatory meaning where a reasonable non-defamatory meaning is available.

The Chase levels assist in identifying the sting of an allegation but are not a rigid classification system. A report that a person is being investigated may convey that there are reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing, depending on the surrounding circumstances. An online article may convey that the grounds for suspicion continue to exist where its continued publication reasonably produces that impression.

The claimant, a general practitioner, sued the defendant broadcaster over two television news broadcasts and an online article concerning an investigation by NHS Protect into alleged fraud connected with her former surgery. The parties agreed that the publications satisfied the serious harm requirement. They disputed the meaning conveyed by the broadcasts and by the article, including whether the article conveyed continuing grounds for suspicion at the date of publication.

The court was required to determine the single meaning conveyed by each publication to the hypothetical reasonable viewer or reader.

1. Meaning. Meaning is assessed from the viewpoint of the hypothetical reasonable reader or viewer. The court must consider the words as a whole, including context and any bane and antidote, and must avoid over-elaborate analysis. The court is entitled to reach its own conclusion rather than adopt either party’s pleaded meaning: Waterson v Lloyd [2013] EWCA Civ 136; Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 130; Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1995] 2 A.C. 65.
2. Television broadcasts are seen only once, and that circumstance forms part of the context. The court may have regard to the impression made on it as a reasonable viewer, while avoiding any preference for a bad meaning over a good one: Bukowsky v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] EWCA Civ 1529; Skuse v Granada Television [1996] EMLR 278.
3. The three Chase levels identify meanings that the claimant committed the act, that there were reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant, and that there were grounds for investigating whether the claimant committed it: Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772; [2003] EMLR 11. Those levels assist the analysis but are not a straight-jacket. The distinction between reasonable grounds to suspect and grounds to suspect may depend on the context and the information available: Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234; Brown v Bower [2017] EWHC 2637 (QB); [2017] 4 WLR 197.
4. The broadcasts conveyed that there were reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant of carrying out fraudulent activity against the NHS while running the surgery. The references to NHS Protect, its specialisation in fraud, and the link between the investigation and the claimant’s actions at the surgery took the meaning beyond mere grounds to investigate. The claimant’s denial did not prevent that meaning because it was contradicted by the NHS medical director’s statement.
5. The online article conveyed that there were reasonable grounds, and that at the date of publication there continued to be reasonable grounds, to suspect the claimant of carrying out fraudulent activity against the NHS while running the surgery. Continued online publication reasonably conveyed continuing grounds for suspicion, applying the reasoning in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 2182 (QB).
6. The preliminary issue was determined by declaring those meanings.