Rooftops South West Ltd & Ors v Ash Interiors (UK) Ltd & Ors

An enforcement agent exercising powers under a writ of control must comply with the statutory conditions governing notice, location, entry and ownership. A writ is not a licence to act without regard to those requirements. Notice is a prerequisite to taking control of goods. Goods on private premises generally require an entry warrant, and goods may be taken only if they belong to the debtor. A statutory reasonable-belief defence requires proof of a reasonable belief on the evidence. Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 does not create an exhaustive code excluding common-law or statutory claims by third-party owners where its provisions do not address the factual situation. Procedural breaches may justify declarations and damages, subject to causation and loss.

The claim arose from enforcement of a County Court judgment for £1,557.93 obtained by Ash Interiors (UK) Ltd against Rooftops South West Ltd. DCBL, acting through a High Court enforcement officer, seized a van on private premises and later seized a powerboat from a private boat park. The claimants alleged failures to give effective notices, obtain an entry warrant and comply with the statutory limits on taking control of goods. The individual claimants also claimed in respect of the boat under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, while one claimant alleged misuse of private information arising from filming during enforcement. The court determined liability only.

1. Liability. The liability issues were resolved in favour of the claimants. Quantum remained to be determined, and the privacy claim was stayed.
2. Under paragraph 7 of Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, notice is a prerequisite to taking control of goods. No effective notice had been given for the van. The notices sent to the boat park were ineffective because it was not a place where the debtor carried on business.
3. Paragraph 9 permitted taking control only on premises which the enforcement agent had power to enter or on a highway. The van was seized on private premises without the warrant required by paragraph 15. The same defect applied to the boat seized at the private boat park. Taking possession of vehicle keys was sufficient to secure the vehicle and constituted an exercise, or purported exercise, of enforcement powers.
4. Paragraph 10 permitted control only of goods belonging to the debtor. The boat belonged to the individual claimants, not Rooftops. The defence under paragraph 66(8)(a) required the defendants to establish a reasonable belief that the boat belonged to the debtor. The available invoices were equivocal, the agents ignored plausible contrary assertions and no enforcement agent gave evidence. The defence therefore failed.
5. Rules 85.4 and 85.5 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and paragraph 60 of Schedule 12 governed applications for goods remaining under enforcement control. They did not prevent the individual owners from bringing a claim under the 1977 Act after the boat had been returned. Schedule 12 was not an exhaustive code of all rights and remedies arising from enforcement activity. Paragraph 66(2) was directed to debtor claims and did not provide a general defence to third-party claims.
6. A writ of control was not a blank cheque. Enforcement agents remained bound to act lawfully. The court referred the conduct of the enforcement officer and relevant agents to the Senior Master for consideration, including possible authorisation consequences under regulation 12 of the High Court Enforcement Officers Regulations 2004.
7. The privacy claim raised apparent tensions with the National Standards and had some features in common with Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd [2018] EWHC 298, but liability was not determined and the claim was stayed.

Not stated in the judgment.