MESHARY ALENEZY v SHERGROUP LIMITED & Anor

Where enforcement agents take control of goods claimed by a third party, Schedule 12 paragraph 60 applies whether the goods were taken lawfully or unlawfully and whether they are wholly or partly owned by the third party. CPR Part 85 is the applicable procedure for claims concerning such controlled goods. Its procedural requirements should identify and resolve genuine disputes; they do not create loopholes enabling enforcement agents to retain goods or manufacture a dispute to obtain payment into court. Failure to comply with the statutory obligation to take only the debtor’s goods, refusal to return clearly misidentified goods, breach of an injunction and reliance on false assertions may justify indemnity costs.

The claimant’s brother was the judgment debtor. The defendants, acting as enforcement agents, took control of the claimant’s high-value vehicle at premises associated with the brother, despite evidence that the vehicle belonged to the claimant. The claimant applied urgently for an injunction requiring its return and preventing its sale.

The vehicle was eventually returned, so the remaining issues were the applicable statutory and procedural framework, whether the injunction application was abusive or procedurally defective, and liability for the parties’ costs. The claimant sought indemnity costs; the defendants argued that the wrong procedure had been used and that the claimant should bear the costs.

1. Application of Schedule 12. The court held that the statutory scheme applied to goods taken under an enforcement power, irrespective of whether the enforcement agent had acted lawfully. Paragraph 60 was intended to protect third parties while ownership disputes were resolved. Excluding unlawfully taken goods would produce an unexpected and redundant result. The paragraph also applied where the goods were wholly owned by the third party, not merely jointly owned.
2. Relationship with other remedies. Schedule 12 was not an exhaustive code excluding claims under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. Such claims could continue, but paragraph 60 protections and restrictions also applied. The defendants had no general defence based on reasonable belief: the evidence did not support any reasonable belief that the vehicle belonged to the debtor, and the relevant statutory protections were inapplicable on the facts.
3. CPR Part 85. The claim was one to which CPR Part 85 applied. The claimant had substantially complied with the pre-action requirements and had issued an application capable of being treated under that Part. The absence of a formal address for service was immaterial. The court could make an order requiring return of the vehicle under Part 85.10(1)(g). Procedural defects did not justify allowing the defendants to retain goods which plainly belonged to a third party.
4. The defendants had taken the vehicle in breach of paragraph 10, failed to engage with the ownership claim, manufactured a supposed dispute and failed to comply promptly with the injunction. A hearing was therefore necessary. The defendants were ordered to pay the claimant’s costs on an indemnity basis up to and including 4 March, and on the standard basis from 5 March onwards. The injunction was discharged after return of the vehicle. A payment of £15,000 on account of costs was ordered, with liberty to apply concerning apportionment between the defendants.
5. The conduct of the enforcement agents was referred to the Senior Master for consideration.

First-instance decision. The judgment records an interim injunction granted by Bourne J at the initial hearing, followed by the return-date hearing before Simon Tinkler sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court.