Yvonne Emiantor v Fando Freight

A third-party claim to controlled goods under Schedule 12 to the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 must comply with the strict seven-day notice requirement in CPR r.85.4(1). An application under r.85.5 must also be made promptly. Money transferred electronically or paid by card is not controlled goods because it is not tangible property capable of being secured and sold under Schedule 12. A claim under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, conversion or wrongful interference with goods must be commenced by claim form, not application notice. Conversion does not extend to bank money, and sections 3 and 4 of the 1977 Act concern remedies rather than the cause of action.

The claimant obtained a County Court judgment for £2,690 against Fando Freight. An enforcement agent later attended premises at which the third-party claimant traded as Fando Foods. She paid £4,200 by bank transfer or personal credit card to stop goods being removed, then sought recovery under CPR r.85.5 and sections 3 and 4 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977.

The court had to decide whether the notice and application were in time, whether the digitally paid £4,200 were controlled goods under Schedule 12 to the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, and whether the proposed conversion and statutory claims were procedurally and substantively available.

Disposition. The court dismissed the application.

1. Time limits. CPR r.85.4(1) imposed a strict seven-day period for notice of a third-party claim to controlled goods. Consistently with Hamilton v Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2021] EWHC 2647 (QB), reported at [2022] 1 WLR 1707, the enforcement scheme required expedition. Although r.85.5 contained no express filing period, an application to the court had to be made promptly by implication. Notice given 169 days after removal, followed by the late application, could not be entertained. The court rejected the existence of a retrospective extension discretion. Alternatively, relief would have been refused because the delay was serious and unexplained and the claimant had long since received the £4,200.
2. Controlled goods. Section 62 and paragraph 1 of Schedule 12 to the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 showed that the statutory procedure concerned taking control of goods and selling them to recover money. The statutory definitions and methods of control contemplated property capable of being secured in a physical location. Applying Court Enforcement Services Ltd v Marston Legal Services Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 588, reported at [2021] QB 129, the court held that bank money paid digitally was not controlled goods. Paragraph 60(1) and r.85.5 therefore supplied no remedy. Alenezy v Shergroup Ltd [2022] EWHC 777 (QB) did not assist, since it concerned the taking of control of a vehicle and did not address digital money.
3. Conversion and statutory remedies. A claim under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, conversion or wrongful interference with goods had to be commenced by an N1 claim form, not an N244 application notice. Sections 3 and 4 concerned remedies where goods were detained, not the cause of action. Applying OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, reported at [2008] 1 AC 1, and section 14 of the 1977 Act, the court held that conversion applied only to physical chattels or goods and not to bank money.
4. Factual context. Although the third-party claimant was not the named judgment debtor, the court found her relationship with Fando Freight and Mr Olundegun opaque. That finding did not overcome the independent legal defects in the application.

No appeal is stated. The judgment records the underlying County Court judgment and the dismissal of an application to amend the named defendant, but no appellate decision.