C v D & Anor

Termination of a father’s parental responsibility is governed by the child’s welfare and is a rare remedy. The court must assess the parent’s commitment, attachment and ability to exercise parental responsibility beneficially, and consider whether lesser orders would adequately protect the child. Parental responsibility is not removed as punishment for misconduct.

In deciding whether to change a child’s surname, welfare remains paramount. Registration, familial identity, present and future circumstances, the reasons for any earlier change, and the effect of the existing surname are relevant, but no single factor is decisive.

The mother applied to terminate the father’s parental responsibility for their autistic child, change the child’s surname and extend a non-molestation order. The father, who did not attend the hearing, opposed termination and the change of surname but consented to a passport application.

The evidence concerned his repeated intimidating, abusive and obstructive conduct towards the mother and professionals involved in the child’s care, together with his lack of constructive engagement with decisions about the child’s health, education and welfare. The central questions were whether termination and a change of surname served the child’s welfare, and whether the non-molestation order could be extended without further notice.

1. Parental responsibility. The application to terminate the father’s parental responsibility was granted. Under sections 1 and 4 of the Children Act 1989, the child’s welfare was paramount. The statutory presumption that parental involvement furthers welfare applied, but was rebutted on the evidence.
2. Termination was rare and was not a punishment. The court applied the principles in Re P (Terminating Parental Responsibility) [1995] 1 FLR 1048, including the need for solid grounds and consideration of commitment, attachment and the parent’s capacity to exercise parental responsibility beneficially. The father’s conduct showed little commitment or attachment and had produced conflict, delay and stress in decisions affecting the child.
3. The court considered whether specific issue, prohibited steps or other protective orders would suffice. They would not cover every future decision and the father was likely to exploit any gap. It was therefore in the child’s best interests to remove parental responsibility.
4. Change of surname. The child’s surname was changed. Applying the welfare-based approach in Re W, Re A, Re B (Change of Name) [1999] 3 FCR 337 and [1999] 2 FLR 930, and the principles referred to in Re B and C (Change of Names - Parental Responsibility - Evidence) [2017] EWHC 3250 (Fam), the registered surname and its connection with the father were relevant but not decisive. The child’s identity and welfare, and the likely future harm caused by the existing link, justified the change.
5. Other orders. No passport order was required because parental responsibility had ceased. The application to extend the non-molestation order was refused. It would have been inappropriate to continue a wide-ranging order without notice, although the existing order remained in force until 22 November 2018, allowing a properly notified renewal application.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.