B and C (Change of Names: Parental Responsibility: Evidence)

A child’s forename and surname are important aspects of identity. An order changing them must be determined by the child’s welfare, including present and future consequences, and requires compelling reasons where the change is opposed by a parent with parental responsibility. Parental responsibility is an important status, but it may be restricted by a prohibited steps order where this is necessary and proportionate to protect the child. In an exceptional case involving a real risk of abduction and serious harm, the court may prohibit a parent from taking any step in exercising parental responsibility and may authorise a change of name without that parent’s consent. Procedural fairness may permit evidence containing sensitive location information to be withheld where disclosure presents a compelling risk and the restriction is fair and proportionate.

The applications concerned two children living with their mother in England. Their father, believed to be living in Iran, had removed them there in breach of an existing prohibited steps order. The children were later recovered and returned to England, but the mother feared further abduction, physical and emotional harm, and disclosure of their whereabouts.

The father had been served with the proceedings but did not participate. The mother sought permission to change the children’s forenames and surname, restrictions on the father’s exercise of parental responsibility, permission to proceed in his absence, and permission to withhold her final witness statement containing detailed location information.

1. Proceeding in the father’s absence. The father had received reasonable notice of the applications and hearing, had been given an opportunity to communicate with the court, and had not done so. The conditions in rules 27.4(2) and 27.4(3) FPR 2010 were satisfied. It was just, proportionate and fair to determine the applications in his absence.
2. Withholding evidence. Disclosure of the mother’s final statement was governed by the need for rigorous examination of the risk and gravity of feared harm. The case for non-disclosure was compelling. The father did not immediately need the location information to understand or answer the essential allegations. Withholding the statement was therefore fair and proportionate, subject to review if he later engaged with the proceedings.
3. Names. A child’s name is an important part of identity. The welfare principle applies to both forenames and surnames, and the court must consider present and future consequences. The registered name, biological and familial connection, the duration of the child’s association with the name, the child’s wishes, and the reasons for the proposed change were relevant but not individually decisive.
4. Parental responsibility. Parental responsibility could not simply be revoked or withdrawn in the circumstances. However, the court could prohibit the father from taking steps in its exercise. The paramountcy principle applied, and the restriction had to be justified by the children’s welfare and Convention rights. The facts established an exceptional and serious risk of renewed abduction, loss of the children’s relationship with their mother, and further abuse. A comprehensive restriction was necessary and proportionate.
5. The court ordered that the children live with their mother, have no contact with the father, and that he take no step in exercising parental responsibility until each child reached 18 or further order. The mother could make decisions unilaterally. Permission was granted for the children’s names to be changed without reference to the father, with confidentiality protections. The wardship was discharged and existing protective orders continued.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.