Maharaj and another v Motor One Insurance Company Limited

A claim by a judgment creditor against a motor insurer under section 10(1) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act is an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of an enactment. It therefore attracts the four-year limitation period under section 3(1)(c) of the Limitation of Certain Actions Act. The statutory right is independent of the insurance policy. It does not merely transfer contractual rights or displace privity of contract. Any postponement for deliberate concealment requires an identified fact relevant to the right of action, meaning a fact needed to establish a prima facie case. Knowledge of the policy and compliance with the statutory notice requirement, without proof of a deliberately concealed relevant fact, does not postpone limitation.

Two claimants injured in a 1988 road collision obtained judgment on liability against the driver in 1998, with damages assessed in 2005. The damages remained unpaid. In 2013 they sued the insurer under section 10(1) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act. Kangaloo J gave judgment in the High Court on 29 July 2015. On 13 April 2016 the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and held the claim barred under section 3(1)(c) of the Limitation of Certain Actions Act. The appeal concerned the classification of the statutory insurance claim for limitation purposes, the alleged legislative lacuna following repeal of the former Ordinance, and whether deliberate concealment postponed time.

Appeal dismissed. Lord Wilson gave the judgment of the Board.

1. Nature of the right. Section 10(1) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act creates an independent statutory cause of action. A claimant does not sue under the policy as though a party to it. The right is to recover the amount identified in the judgment against the insured person, subject to the statutory qualifications in the subsection. Those qualifications may produce a recovery higher or lower than the amount recoverable under the policy.
2. Limitation. The claim was an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of an enactment within section 3(1)(c) of the Limitation of Certain Actions Act. The four-year limitation period therefore applied. The Board relied on the distinction drawn in Matadeen v Caribbean Insurance Co Ltd [2002] UKPC 69, [2003] 1 WLR 670, between a statutory section 10 action and a contractual section 17 action. It was unnecessary to decide whether accrual occurred on 28 April 1998, when liability was established, or on 11 August 2005, when damages were assessed, since the claim was barred on either date. The argument based on a 12-year period for actions upon judgments did not alter that conclusion.
3. Deliberate concealment. Section 14(1)(b) of the Limitation of Certain Actions Act did not postpone limitation. The claimants knew of the insurance policy and had given the statutory notice required by section 10(2) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act. They identified no fact deliberately concealed by the insurer. Applying C v Mirror Group Newspapers [1997] 1 WLR 131, a relevant fact is one which must be proved to establish a prima facie case. The insurer’s failure to disclose whether the driver was a permitted driver did not amount to deliberate concealment.
4. The claimants were ordered to pay the insurer’s costs of the appeal, subject to any powerful contrary argument.

• Privy Council: Appeal as of right dismissed under [2018] UKPC 8, with costs ordered to the respondent subject to contrary argument.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: On 13 April 2016, reversed the High Court judgment and held the claim barred by section 3(1)(c) of the Limitation of Certain Actions Act.
• High Court: Kangaloo J gave judgment on 29 July 2015. That judgment was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeal.